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THE SUPREME COURT IN BONDAGE:  
CONSTITUTIONAL STARE DECISIS, LEGAL 
FORMALISM, AND THE FUTURE OF UNENUMERATED 
RIGHTS* 
Lawrence B. Solum** 
I.  INTRODUCTION:  CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ABOUT CONSTITUTIONAL 
STARE DECISIS 
Constitutional stare decisis is a hot topic.  One reason for the heat 
is the reemergence of originalism as an important movement in con-
stitutional theory and practice.  Originalism calls into question the 
legitimacy of many of the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions—
including the unenumerated rights decisions of the Warren and Bur-
ger Courts.  This destabilizing potential of originalism has led 
originalists to debate among themselves the role that precedent 
should play in constitutional adjudication.1  But this debate is of more 
 
 * © 2006 by the Author.  Permission is hereby granted to duplicate this paper for scholarly 
or teaching purposes, including permission to reproduce multiple copies or post on the Inter-
net for classroom use and to quote extended passages in scholarly work, subject only to the re-
quirement that this copyright notice, the title of the article, a citation to the original publica-
tion, and the name of the author be prominently included in the copy or extended excerpt.  
Permission is hereby granted to use short excerpts (500 words or less) with an appropriate cita-
tion and without inclusion of a copyright notice.  In the event of the death or permanent inca-
pacity of the author, all claims to copyright in the work are relinquished and the work is dedi-
cated to the public domain in perpetuity. 
 ** John E. Cribbet Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law.  I am grateful to 
the participants at faculty workshops at Georgia State University School of Law and Rutgers-
Camden School of Law and at the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law’s Ninth 
Annual Symposium, “The Future of Unenumerated Rights.”  I owe special thanks to Dennis 
Patterson and Randy E. Barnett for their helpful comments, criticisms, and suggestions. 
 1 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory:  The Case 
of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1773–74 (1997) (criticizing the attempt to use stare de-
cisis to reconcile originalist interpretive tendencies with respect for cases decided on non-
originalist grounds); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Political Function of Originalist Ambiguity, 19 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 487–88 (1996) (contrasting robust and moderate originalism in 
terms of their approaches to precedent); Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 509, 516–17 (1996) (arguing that attempting to combine originalism with conventional 
reliance on precedent leads to unpredictability because one never knows when an originalist 
judge will bow to precedent at the expense of the historical understanding and when he will 
not); Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2001) 
(developing a theory of stare decisis that does not include a presumption against overruling 
precedent); Peter J. Smith, The Marshall Court and the Originalist’s Dilemma, 90 MINN. L. REV. 612, 
616–17 (2006) (discussing the problem faced by originalists who wish to ignore the decisions of 
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than theoretical interest.  The recent nominees for Justice and Chief 
Justice—Judges Samuel Alito and John Roberts—were questioned ex-
tensively about their views on stare decisis.2  And this debate has an 
odd flavor.  In the Warren Court era, the political, judicial, and aca-
demic left seemed to view constitutional stare decisis as the enemy of 
progressive (living constitution) constitutionalism.  In the Roberts 
Court era, stare decisis may be the last defense of Warren Court 
precedents against conservative (originalist) constitutionalism on the 
ascendancy. 
Current debates about constitutional stare decisis take place in a 
jurisprudential and legal context.  Contemporary thinking about the 
role of precedent in constitutional adjudication is influenced by 
many sources, but two ideas shape current debates.  The first shaping 
idea is the realist (or “legal instrumentalist”) view of precedent.  
Crudely put, legal realism rejects the idea that precedent is a source 
of binding rules as part and parcel of a wholesale rejection of legal 
formalism.  If all legal reasoning should be instrumentalist, then, it 
would seem to follow, reasoning about constitutional precedents 
should focus on policy or a balancing of relevant interests.  The sec-
ond shaping idea is the Supreme Court’s well-settled doctrine that it 
has unfettered power to overrule its own prior decisions.3  Whereas a 
three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeal is bound to 
follow circuit precedent4 and the lower federal courts are bound to 
follow the decisions of the United States Supreme Court,5 the Su-
preme Court considers its own prior decisions as entitled to defer-
ence or a presumption of correctness but not as binding. 
Given these two shaping ideas—realism and the Supreme Court’s 
freedom to overrule itself—it is not surprising to find contemporary 
theorists groping for some notion of precedent that has more 
“oomph” than a mere presumption.  One product of this theoretical 
 
the Marshall Court in favor of constitutional interpretations favored by Anti-Federalist contem-
poraries of the Court); Norman R. Williams, The Failings of Originalism:  The Federal Courts and the 
Power of Precedent, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 761, 767 (2004) (examining the constitutionality of 
court rules that limit the precedential value of decisions). 
 2 See, e.g., T.R. Goldman, Senators Question Alito on Abortion, Stare Decisis, Executive Power, 
LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 11, 2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1136887514780; Jeffrey 
Rosen, Liberals Shouldn’t Fight Roberts, NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE, Sept. 12, 2005, 
https://ssl.tnr.com/p/docsub.mhtml?i=20050919&s =rosen091905. 
 3 See Lawrence B. Solum, Stare Decisis, Law of the Case, and Judicial Estoppel, in 18 MOORE’S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 134.02[1][b], at 134-14 to -15 (Daniel R. Coquillette et al. eds., 3d ed. 
2005) (describing the Court’s philosophy on overturning its own precedents). 
 4 See id. § 134.02[1][c], at 134-16 to -18 (“The published decision of a panel of a court of 
appeals is a decision of the court and carries the weight of stare decisis.”). 
 5 See id. § 134.02[2], at 134-25 to -26 (“[T]he district courts in a circuit owe obedience to a 
decision of the court of appeals in that circuit and ordinarily must follow it until the court of 
appeals overrules it.”). 
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floundering has been the idea of “super-precedent,” “super-stare de-
cisis,” or even “super-duper-precedent.”6  The particular focus of this 
discussion is usually the Supreme Court’s decision in Planned Parent-
hood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,7 the relevant paragraphs of 
which are quoted in full in the footnote accompanying this text.8  In 
Casey, the Supreme Court suggested that Roe v. Wade should only be 
overruled if “found unworkable” and not if its overruling would cre-
ate “serious inequity to those who have relied upon it or significant 
 
 6 See Posting of Randy Barnett to The Volokh Conspiracy, 
http://volokh.com/posts/1130273312.shtml (Oct. 24, 2005, 16:48 EST) (describing developing 
academic recognition of the idea of super-precedent); Posting of Feddie to Confirm Them, 
http://www.confirmthem.com/?p=1901 (Nov. 11, 2005, 13:44 EST) (discussing a verbal ex-
change, attributed to Judges Luttig and Easterbrook, over the concept of “super-precedent” 
attributing the use of “super-stare decisis” to Judge Luttig); Posting of Orin Kerr to The Volokh 
Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/ 1130824707.shtml (Nov. 1, 2005, 12:58 EST) (recount-
ing online colloquy regarding precedent, super-precedent, and super-duper-precedent). 
 7 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 8 The opinion of the Court states:  
 The obligation to follow precedent begins with necessity, and a contrary necessity 
marks its outer limit.  With Cardozo, we recognize that no judicial system could do soci-
ety’s work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it.  See B. Cardozo, The 
Nature of the Judicial Process 149 (1921).  Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law 
underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for 
precedent is, by definition, indispensable.  See Powell, Stare Decisis and Judicial Re-
straint, 1991 Journal of Supreme Court History 13, 16.  At the other extreme, a differ-
ent necessity would make itself felt if a prior judicial ruling should come to be seen so 
clearly as error that its enforcement was, for that very reason, doomed. 
 Even when the decision to overrule a prior case is not, as in the rare, latter in-
stance, virtually foreordained, it is common wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an 
“inexorable command,” and certainly it is not such in every constitutional case, see 
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405–411 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).  See also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 842 (1991) (SOUTER, J., joined by 
KENNEDY, J., concurring); Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984).  Rather, when 
this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily informed by a series 
of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency of overrul-
ing a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs of 
reaffirming and overruling a prior case.  Thus, for example, we may ask whether the 
rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability, Swift & Co. v. 
Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965); whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that 
would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to 
the cost of repudiation, e.g., United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486 
(1924); whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old 
rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine, see Patterson v. McLean Credit Un-
ion, 491 U.S. 164, 173–174 (1989); or whether facts have so changed, or come to be 
seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justifica-
tion, e.g., Burnet, supra, at 412 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 So in this case, we may enquire whether Roe’s central rule has been found un-
workable; whether the rule’s limitation on state power could be removed without seri-
ous inequity to those who have relied upon it or significant damage to the stability of 
the society governed by it; whether the law’s growth in the intervening years has left 
Roe’s central rule a doctrinal anachronism discounted by society; and whether Roe’s 
premises of fact have so far changed in the ensuing two decades as to render its central 
holding somehow irrelevant or unjustifiable in dealing with the issue it addressed. 
Id. at 854–55. 
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damage to the stability of the society governed by it.”9  Senator Arlen 
Specter’s Op-Ed in The New York Times gave the phrase popular cur-
rency: 
The confirmation precedents forcefully support the propriety of a 
nominee declining to spell out how he or she would rule on a specific 
case.  Abraham Lincoln is reputed to have said pretty much the same 
thing:  “We cannot ask a man what he will do, and if we should, and he 
should answer us, we would despise him.  Therefore, we must take a man 
whose opinions are known.” 
This, of course, does not foreclose probing inquiries on the nomi-
nee’s general views on jurisprudence.  For example, it would be appro-
priate to ask how to weigh the importance of precedent in deciding 
whether to overrule a Supreme Court decision.  Some legal scholars at-
tach special significance to what they call superprecedents, which are de-
cisions like Roe v. Wade that have been reaffirmed in later cases.10 
The first use of the term “super-stare decisis” that appears in West-
law’s database of journals and law reviews is by Earl Maltz in 1992, 
who wrote of Casey: 
The theoretical problems with the Court’s opinion are even more 
troubling.  The implications of the argument are breathtaking.  The 
analysis reverses the accepted view that interventionist constitutional de-
cisions should be granted less protection under the doctrine of stare de-
cisis because they cannot be corrected by other branches of government.  
In essence, the opinion asserts that if one side can take control of the 
Court on an issue of major national importance, it can not only use the 
Constitution to bind other branches of government to its position, but 
also have that position protected from later judicial action by a kind of 
super-stare decisis.11 
The same database does not reveal subsequent uses of “super-
precedent” or related terms in a similar context, although the term is 
used on several occasions to refer to precedents that have been very 
influential, frequently cited, or often followed.12 
The notion of super-stare decisis is difficult to square with the re-
alist conception of legal rules and with the Supreme Court’s power to 
overrule its own prior decisions.  What is so super about super-
 
 9 Id. at 855. 
 10 Arlen Specter, Op-Ed., Bringing the Hearings to Order, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2005, § 4, at 12. 
 11 Earl M. Maltz, Abortion, Precedent, and the Constitution:  A Comment on Planned Parenthood 
of Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 11, 26 (1992) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 12 This usage traces back to William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent:  A Theo-
retical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 251 (1976) (defining a “superprecedent” as a 
case “that is so effective in defining the requirements of the law that it prevents legal disputes 
from arising in the first place”).  See also Montgomery N. Kosma, Measuring the Influence of Su-
preme Court Justices, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 339 n.18 (1998) (citing the Landes & Posner defini-
tion). 
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precedent if it can be overruled for instrumentalist reasons?  This 
question is highlighted by the joint opinion of Justices Kennedy, 
O’Connor, and Souter in Casey, which made the question of whether 
Roe should be overturned a matter of the balance of instrumental 
concerns, like workability, reliance, and so forth.  For realists, super-
precedents are really just super reasons to follow precedent or super 
interests to balance against those interests that favor a change in the 
law. 
In this essay, I shall advance a very different approach to constitu-
tional stare decisis.  I shall argue that instrumentalist accounts of 
precedent are inherently unsatisfying and that the Supreme Court 
should abandon adherence to the doctrine that it is free to overrule 
its own prior decisions.  These moves are embedded in a larger theo-
retical framework—a revival of formalist ideas in legal theory that I 
shall call “neoformalism” to distinguish my view from the so-called 
“formalism” caricatured by the legal realists (and from some other 
views that are called “formalist”).13 
Here’s the roadmap.  In Part II, The Critique of Unenumerated Consti-
tutional Rights, we set the stage by briefly recalling why the unenu-
merated rights precedents are under theoretical (and political) siege.  
Then, in Part III, Neoformalism, Stare Decisis, and the Rule of Law, we ex-
amine the jurisprudential roots of a formalist revival that would cre-
ate theoretical space for the idea that the Supreme Court should re-
gard itself as bound by precedent.  In Part IV, A Neoformalist 
Conception of Constitutional Stare Decisis, that theoretical framework is 
deployed to develop the outline of a neoformalist theory of constitu-
tional stare decisis.  This conception is brought down to earth in Part 
V, which answers the question posed by its title:  Does the Neoformalist 
Conception of Constitutional Stare Decisis Support Contemporary Unenumer-
ated Rights Jurisprudence?  We wrap it all up in Part VI, Unenumerated 
Rights and the Future of Constitutional Doctrine. 
Let’s get down to business. 
II.  THE CRITIQUE OF UNENUMERATED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
Why all the fuss about unenumerated rights?  Before we dig into 
constitutional stare decisis, it is worth taking a quick tour of the cri-
tique of unenumerated rights jurisprudence.  I won’t develop the cri-
tique in a thorough or sophisticated way—that’s the topic of another 
 
 13 In particular, my views are very different than those of Ernest Weinrib.  See Ernest J. Wein-
rib, Legal Formalism:  On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 953–54 (1988) (“For-
malism can accordingly be summed up as proffering the possibility of an ‘immanent moral ra-
tionality.’”) (citing Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 561, 571 (1983)). 
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very long article or book.  What I will do is touch on some of the 
highlights. 
There are many different ways of criticizing the Supreme Court’s 
unenumerated rights decisions.  For example, it might be argued that 
decisions like Griswold, Roe, and Lawrence are wrong as a matter of po-
litical morality:  in other words, one might argue that an ideal polity 
would not afford the specific rights those cases created.  Another line 
of criticism might focus on democratic theory.  It might be argued 
that unelected judges should not act legislatively, and that judicial re-
view should be limited to representation reinforcement, i.e. enforc-
ing only those rights that are necessary to democratic self-
governance.  But I will not pursue either of these criticisms—instead, 
my focus will be on “formalist” criticism of the Supreme Court’s un-
enumerated rights jurisprudence—the argument that the unenumer-
ated rights cases constitute judicial lawmaking without sanction from 
the original meaning of the written text of the Constitution. 
A.  Unenumerated Rights as Judicial Lawmaking 
One way of getting at formalist discomfort with the Court’s un-
enumerated rights jurisprudence is via the notion of judicial legisla-
tion.  The core idea is simple.  It begins with a proposition of general 
normative legal theory:  the proper role of judges is to interpret and 
apply the law.  The next move is to characterize the unenumerated 
rights cases as judicial lawmaking.  At an intuitive level, this move is at 
least plausible.  The sentence, “The Supreme Court created the right 
of women to choose whether to have an abortion in Roe v. Wade,” 
does not seem to rest on an egregious factual error. 
The question is whether that characterization of the unenumer-
ated rights cases as judicial legislation is correct.  That question is, of 
course, complex.  At this point, I should like to set aside the possibil-
ity that cases like Griswold, Roe, and Lawrence might be defended on 
textualist and originalist grounds; we’ll return to that possibility in 
Section D, A Caveat:  The Possibility of an Originalist Defense of Unenu-
merated Rights Based on the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  But might there be other ways 
of defending the Court’s unenumerated rights jurisprudence as ap-
plication of the law and legal interpretation?  Answering that ques-
tion in full will take us far afield:  the attempts to rationalize the 
Court’s privacy cases have consumed the energies of generations of 
constitutional theorists.  Nonetheless, we can take a quick peek at one 
strategy to defend the privacy cases—a strategy rooted in Ronald 
Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity. 
A Dworkinian defense of the Supreme Court’s privacy cases would 
not concede that these decisions are examples of judicial lawmaking.  
Dworkin himself developed such a defense in his book Life’s Domin-
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ion.14  Dworkin’s general strategy is to sever the connection between 
constitutional interpretation and the meaning of specific provisions 
of the constitutional text.  Rather than parsing the language of the 
Due Process Clause, the Dworkinian enterprise requires judges to 
identify the general principles of political morality that best “fit and 
justify” our constitutional practice.15  By equating these principles 
with “the law,” Dworkin’s theory creates the possibility of resisting the 
characterization of the Supreme Court’s unenumerated rights cases 
as judicial lawmaking. 
From a formalist perspective, Dworkin’s defense of cases like Gris-
wold, Roe, and Lawrence has the great virtue of attempting to square 
those cases with the idea that judges should not simply make the law.  
In that respect, Dworkin’s defense parts company with legal realism 
and instrumentalism.  But formalists are unlikely to accept Dworkin’s 
key move—the conceptual ascent from constitutional text to princi-
ples of political morality and the accompanying conceptual descent 
to a justification of a general constitutional right to privacy.  Why not?  
Once again, a complete and thorough answer will take us too far 
afield. 
But a short answer is possible, if not fully satisfying.  One way of 
putting it is to say that Dworkin relies too little on “fit” and not 
enough on “justification” at the stage of conceptual ascent.  For a 
theory to really fit the United States Constitution, it is not sufficient 
that it would justify a Constitution that included general provisions 
guaranteeing free expression, procedural fairness, and equality.  Real 
fit requires a justification of the actual text of the Constitution.  And 
the actual text of the Constitution does not, with a few possible ex-
ceptions,16 create general and abstract rights of political morality—
especially if that text is understood in historical context.  Another way 
of expressing discomfort with Dworkin’s view focuses on the stage of 
conceptual descent—from general and abstract principles of political 
morality to particular cases.  When Dworkin descends, it seems as if 
the reasoning goes straight from abstract notions to results without 
reengaging the authoritative legal materials—i.e., the constitutional 
 
 14 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION:  AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, 
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993) (detailing Dworkin’s defense of the named 
cases); Gerard V. Bradley, Essay, Life’s Dominion:  A Review Essay, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329 
(1993) (same). 
 15 See DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 111 (“Any interpretation of the Constitution must be tested 
on two large and connected dimensions.  The first is the dimension of the fit. . . . The second is 
the dimension of justice.”). 
 16 For example, there is no “equality clause” of the Constitution, although there is a clause 
that guarantees equal protection of the laws.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws.”).  There is no “procedural fairness clause,” although there is a clause that 
guarantees due process of law.  See id. amends. V & XIV, § 1 (guaranteeing due process of law). 
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text—at the level of detail.  Even if the United States Constitution 
were justified, in part, by a general right to privacy, it does not follow 
that the provisions justified by the political right are identical to it.  It 
might be that the best justification for the Constitution is not best in-
stantiated in the Constitution we actually have.  Yet another way of 
expressing formalist dissatisfaction with Dworkin focuses on the claim 
that the role of law is to settle questions about which there is moral 
disagreement.  If the content of the positive law depends in a strong 
and direct way on underlying principles of ethics and political moral-
ity, then it is difficult to see how law can perform its settling function. 
Finally, it should be noted that many defenders of the Supreme 
Court’s unenumerated rights jurisprudence will not contest the judi-
cial lawmaking characterization.  Realists and instrumentalists of vari-
ous stripes are likely to reply instead:  “Of course, these cases involve 
judicial lawmaking.  All judging is judicial lawmaking.  If cases like 
Griswold, Roe, and Lawrence had come out the other way, that too 
would have been judicial legislation—simply with a different out-
come.”  That’s what instrumentalists might say, but, as I shall argue in 
the remainder of this article, we would not be required to take their 
word for it. 
B.  Unenumerated Rights and a Written Constitution 
The second line of critique is related to the first, but with a slightly 
different focus.  The difficulty with “unenumerated rights”—it might 
be argued—is that they are unenumerated in the context of a written 
constitution.  Because the Constitution is written, so the argument 
goes, unenumerated rights are contrary to the Constitution.  Judges 
are not merely legislating; they are legislating in a manner that is 
fundamentally contrary to the constitutional scheme.  The most obvi-
ous line of reply to this objection would be to contest its premise that 
the Constitution itself is opposed to the notion of unenumerated 
rights:  we will get to that possibility in Section D below. 
Another line of reply denies the premise that the Constitution of 
the United States is entirely written.  Instead, it might be argued that 
the Constitution of the United States is partially “unwritten” as is the 
Constitution of the United Kingdom.  This possibility is explored by 
Tom Grey in a famous essay entitled “Do We Have an Unwritten Con-
stitution?”17  Michael Moore,18 Suzanna Sherry,19 and others have en-
 
 17 Thomas Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 710–14 (1975) 
(considering the implications of literal constitutional interpretation). 
 18 Michael S. Moore, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 107, 115 
(1989) (noting “weak” and “strong” conceptions of the “unwritten constitution,” in which non-
textual material “supplements” and “supplants” the written document, respectively, for the pur-
pose of interpretation). 
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gaged with this idea.  Once again, an adequate resolution of this con-
troversy is beyond the scope of this article.  Some formalists may re-
spond that the rule-of-law values that justify legal formalism are in-
consistent with the notion of an open-ended unwritten constitution, 
with the content to be determined by the discretionary decisions of 
individual judges.  Thus, they will ask how judges can determine the 
content of the unwritten constitution without opening the door to 
open-ended moral and political considerations.  Other formalists will 
argue that the United States Constitution is not “unwritten” or that its 
unwritten provisions do not extend to unenumerated rights.  For the 
purposes of this essay, the point is not to establish the warrant for the 
objection but rather to limit its shape and form. 
C.  Unenumerated Rights and Original Meaning 
A third objection to the Supreme Court’s unenumerated rights 
jurisprudence rests on the notion that cases like Griswold, Roe, and 
Lawrence are inconsistent with the original meaning of the relevant 
provisions of the United States Constitution.  This criticism focuses 
particularly on claims that these cases are warranted by interpretation 
of particular constitutional provisions, such as the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution.  For example, John McGinnis and Nelson Lund 
have written:  “The Griswold-Roe-Lawrence line of cases has no apparent 
basis in the text or original meaning of the Due Process Clauses, and 
the Justices have never tried to show that there is one.”20  Let’s not 
add to the vast quantities of ink already spilled in the debates about 
originalism.  Instead, let me simply observe that the core of contem-
porary originalism is the idea that the Constitution should be inter-
preted in light of the original public meaning of the constitutional 
text.  That core idea appeals to formalists because (as compared with 
the alternatives), it seems to provide a method for reducing dis-
agreement about constitutional meaning.  To the extent that the Su-
preme Court’s unenumerated rights cases require a more latitudinar-
ian approach to constitutional interpretation, formalists will be 
suspicious. 
 
 19 Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1127 (1987) 
(“[T]he founding generation . . . envisioned multiple sources of fundamental law.”). 
 20 Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. 
REV. 1555, 1597 (2004). 
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D.  A Caveat:  The Possibility of an Originalist Defense of Unenumerated 
Rights Based on the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
At this stage of the argument, I need to introduce an important 
caveat.  The Supreme Court’s unenumerated rights cases can (and 
have been) defended on textualist and originalist grounds.  One im-
portant example21 of this approach is found in the work of Randy 
Barnett22—a participant in this symposium.23  Barnett’s argument for 
unenumerated rights is, at its core, quite obvious and direct.  Barnett 
argues that the Constitution itself posits the existence of such rights 
in at least two places.  First, the Ninth Amendment provides:  “The 
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be con-
strued to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”24  Second, 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
states, “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”25  The 
conjunction of these two provisions can plausibly be read as a legal 
requirement for the judicial enforcement of unenumerated rights, 
and hence as the foundation for a formalist justification for cases like 
Griswold, Roe, and Casey. 
Formalist critics of the Supreme Court’s unenumerated rights ju-
risprudence can reply to Barnett in at least two ways.  First, they might 
contend that Barnett has gotten the original meaning of the Ninth 
and Fourteenth Amendments wrong.  Kurt Lash, for example, has 
contested Barnett’s interpretation of the Ninth Amendment.26  Reso-
 
 21 There may be other formalist defenses of unenumerated rights.  For example, it might be 
argued that the phrase “due process of law” did, in fact, have a public meaning that supports 
the Supreme Court’s unenumerated rights jurisprudence.  For a gesture in this direction, see 
Kermit Roosevelt’s contribution to this symposium.  Kermit Roosevelt, Forget the Fundamentals: 
Fixing Substantive Due Process, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 983 (2006). 
 22 See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 60–66 (2003) (arguing that constitutional “privileges” and “immunities” included un-
enumerated liberty rights); see also Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429, 431 (2004) (citing the Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments as 
sources of unenumerated rights and corresponding limits on government); Randy E. Barnett, 
Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution:  Lawrence v. Texas, 2002–2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 24–
29 (focusing on the prominence of the Ninth Amendment in recent substantive due process 
jurisprudence). 
 23 See Randy E. Barnett, Who’s Afraid of Unenumerated Rights?, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2006). 
 24 U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
 25 Id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 26 See Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 597, 600–02 
(2005) (noting that, prior to the New Deal, the Ninth Amendment was interpreted to protect 
state autonomy); Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
331, 360–62 (2004) (contending that with the Ninth Amendment, Madison sought to prevent 
the “constructive enlargement of federal power”).  But see Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amend-
ment:  It Means What It Says 2 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper No. 05-14, 2005), avail-
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lution of that debate is a topic for another day and, I might add, an-
other author.  Second, the critics might concede that Barnett is right 
as a matter of original meaning, but nonetheless contend that these 
provisions of the Constitution should be disregarded for formalist 
reasons.  That is, one might argue that the rule-of-law values of pre-
dictability, certainty, and stability require judicial nullification of the 
Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment on the ground that these provisions create 
an unrestrainable judicial discretion—especially if combined with a 
weak doctrine of stare decisis. 
For the purposes of this article, I will neither take issue with nor 
endorse Barnett’s originalist defense of unenumerated rights.  
Rather, I will simply assume that these issues are still in play.  For the 
sake of argument, I will assume when the Supreme Court decided 
cases like Griswold, Roe, and Lawrence, those cases were not and could 
not be justified on formalist grounds.  Later in this article, that as-
sumption will be relaxed in various ways.  Enough of the formalist cri-
tique, it is time to move on to a more systematic consideration of le-
gal formalism itself. 
III.  NEOFORMALISM, STARE DECISIS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 
I recently had one of those embarrassing moments.  I was having a 
lunchtime conversation with distinguished colleagues and we were 
discussing the topic du jour—the Alito confirmation hearings.  One of 
my colleagues, whom I consider to be one of the greatest legal phi-
losophers of the post-war period, was discussing Justice Roberts’s 
analogy between judging and umpiring.  You may remember the fol-
lowing testimony: 
Judges are like umpires.  Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them. 
The role of an umpire and a judge is critical.  They make sure everybody 
plays by the rules, but it is a limited role.  Nobody ever went to a ballgame 
to see the umpire.27 
My colleague then proceeded to ridicule Roberts’s view.  I can’t re-
member the exact words, but they amounted to something like the 
following:  No one (serious) could possibly think that judges are like 
umpires.  Of course, judges make law—they have to.  Who could (se-
riously) think otherwise? 
 
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=789384 (“The purpose of the 
Ninth Amendment was to ensure that all individual natural rights had the same stature and 
force after some of them were enumerated as they had before . . . .”). 
 27 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., To Be Chief Justice of the United 
States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, 
Jr., nominee). 
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I bravely raised my right hand, branding myself as beyond the 
jurisprudential pale—as someone who takes seriously the idea that 
judges should apply the law rather than make it.  I felt like I should 
go to a peculiar sort of twelve-step meeting, where I would be re-
quired to say, “My name is Lawrence Solum and I am a legal formal-
ist.” 
Well, my name is Lawrence Solum, and I am a legal formalist.  I 
do think that judges should apply the law rather than make it—with 
some limited exceptions.  I believe that Justices of the Supreme Court 
should consider themselves bound by the Court’s prior decisions.  I 
even think there is something to the umpire analogy—although not 
as much as Justice Roberts’s testimony suggests.28  Let’s begin with the 
big picture and situate contemporary formalism in the context of the 
contemporary domination of the academy, bench, and bar by in-
strumentalist thinking about law. 
A.  Formalism and Realism 
We swam in a Legal Realist sea.  If anything united the American 
legal academy in the late-twentieth century it was an opposition to le-
gal formalism.  If American law students learned anything in their 
first year, it was that “black letter law” was in disrepute and that law 
school was about policy or maybe fairness—or even politics or empirical 
research—but not unadorned doctrine.  If there was any uncontroversial 
advice for an ambitious young law professor, it was to stay away from 
doctrinal scholarship that is “merely descriptive.”  If any legal theory 
was a bad one, then it was “legal formalism” or “mechanical jurispru-
dence”—the view that disputes can be resolved by the unthinking ap-
plication of abstract and general rules without appreciation of their 
purposes and without regard to the consequences for welfare or fair-
ness.  The disreputability of legal formalism was reflected in a revolu-
tion in legal scholarship—the flowering of law and economics, law 
and philosophy, empirical legal studies, and a variety of other ap-
proaches to the study of law.  Of course, there were exceptions.  For-
malism of a sort was found in originalism in constitutional theory as 
 
 28 Umpires are unlike judges in many respects.  Umpires make their calls in real time—
without the leisure of deliberation.  Umpiral decisions do not set authoritative precedents—
although the collective actions of many umpires may establish a practice that constitutes a sort 
of interpretation or gloss on the rules of a particular sport.  The division of authority between 
trial and appellate judges, which is key to understanding common-law adjudication, has no 
clear counterpart in umpiring.  Arbitrators, and not judges, are the closest legal equivalent to 
umpires. 
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well as plain meaning approaches to statutory interpretation.  But 
these were the exceptions that proved the rule.29 
And the rule was acceptance of what might be called the instrumen-
talist thesis:  roughly, the proposition that the outputs of legal deci-
sion-making processes (paradigmatically, appellate adjudication) are, 
and should be, determined by extralegal considerations—that is, by 
(extralegal30) considerations of policy or principle.31  Contemporary 
American legal thought accepted as an almost dogmatic truth that le-
gal decisions are (and should be) made on instrumental grounds—
shaping outcomes to serve normative concerns.  We were all instru-
mentalists.  Weren’t we?  Aren’t we still? 
We swim in a Legal Realist sea—or do we?  The most extreme form 
of legal instrumentalism embraced what has been called the strong in-
determinacy thesis:  roughly, the notion that the outputs of legal proc-
esses are not constrained by formal legal considerations.32  Stated 
baldly, the claim was that the law does not constrain the choices of 
legal actors:  because any possible outcome can be squared with the law, some-
thing else (principle, policy, or politics) must be doing the real work of deter-
mining which outcomes are selected.  We are most familiar with the ver-
sion of the strong indeterminacy thesis associated with the critical 
legal studies (CLS) movement and expressed in the slogan, “Law is 
Politics.”33  Characteristically, CLS rejected claims that legal decisions 
could be explained by a consistent normative theory—whether it be 
the welfarism of normative law and economics34 or the rights theory 
 
 29 One of the most common objections to constitutional originalism is that it is a “flag of 
convenience”—originalist judges adhere to the original meaning of the Constitution when it 
serves their ideological objectives, but ignore it when it does not. 
 30 Whether considerations of policy and principle are extralegal is itself a complex question, 
implicating debates about the nature of law in general and the controversy between inclusive 
and exclusive legal positivism in particular. 
 31 Fully stated there are actually several instrumentalist theses:  (1) a descriptive claim about 
existing legal practice, (2) a stronger empirical (or conceptual) claim about possible legal prac-
tice, (3) a normative claim of ideal legal theory, and (4) a normative claim of nonideal legal 
theory. 
 32 See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis:  Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 462, 470 (1987) (“The strong version of the indeterminacy thesis claims that . . . in every 
case any result can be derived from the preexisting legal doctrine.”). 
 33 See, e.g., Peter Gabel, What It Really Means to Say “Law is Politics”:  Political History and Legal 
Argument in Bush v. Gore, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 1141, 1143–44 (2002) (offering Bush v. Gore as an 
example of “the political nature of all legal reasoning”); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Black-
stone’s Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 211–14 (1979) (asserting that “collective coercion” 
impacts all legal decisions); Frank Michelman, Bringing the Law to Life:  A Plea for Disenchantment, 
74 CORNELL L. REV. 256, 256–57 (1989) (discussing the importance of viewing law as a “form of 
politics”). 
 34 See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 465 (2002) (advo-
cating welfare economics analysis of legal policy).  Simplifying somewhat, we can say that welfa-
rism is a form of utilitarianism—in the philosophical sense of that term—that has a preference-
based conception of utility. 
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of Dworkin’s law as integrity35—and claiming that political struggle 
between and among oppressed and powerful groups did the explana-
tory work.  American legal theory ended the twentieth century with a 
decisive rejection of critical legal studies—albeit a rejection that was 
soon tempered by the academic firestorm created by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore.36  Legal rules may underdetermine 
outcomes while constraining them.  More fundamentally, systematic 
normative legal theory—whether it comes from the left, right, or cen-
ter in consequentialist or deontological form—needs legal formalism, 
the mechanism by which normative conclusions can be translated 
into rules that can guide low-level legal actors (trial judges and other 
bureaucrats) who cannot be expected to engage in de novo norma-
tive theory every time they must make a decision. 
Thus, we find ourselves in a familiar but disquieting situation.  On 
the one hand, we affirm the instrumentalist thesis, rejecting legal 
formalism as a naïve and unattractive legal theory.  On the other 
hand, we embrace the formalist picture of legal practice in myriad 
ways—blithely deconstructing doctrinalism in the parts one of our ar-
ticles and reconstructing new doctrinal paradigms in the parts penul-
timate.  In the classroom, we ridicule our students’ quest for the easy 
certainty of black letter law, and then on exam day we test them for 
their mastery of intricate formal rules.  We might call this predica-
ment the antinomy of realism and formalism—our simultaneous affirma-
tion and rejection of fundamentally inconsistent ideas about the na-
ture of law. 
What to do?  Faced with this sort of existential dilemma, the easy 
way out is always tempting.  Ignore it!  After all, the antinomy of real-
ism and formalism doesn’t really interfere with our ability to go on 
with our business—writing books and articles, teaching classes.  
Tempting, because, as Yoda would say it, “bliss, ignorance may be.”  
But the subtle ecstasy of rational ignorance often eludes the serious 
and thoughtful.  Once you notice the alligator in the bathtub, it be-
comes hard to ignore. 
All is not lost:  a more principled avoidance option is available.  
Leave it to the experts!  Talk about legal realism and legal formal-
ism—that’s for the jurisprudes and legal philosophers.  If the experts 
are able to work out the antinomy of realism and formalism, more 
power to them.  In the meantime, there are other fish to fry.  I take 
 
 35 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225 (1986) (law as integrity “insists that legal 
claims are interpretive judgments [that] combine backward- and forward-looking elements”).  
See generally RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985) (providing further information 
about the concept of “law as integrity”); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) 
(same). 
 36 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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the defer-to-the-experts option seriously, and use it myself on occa-
sion in other contexts.  But this technique of avoidance will not do 
for most of us who do normative legal theory—especially constitu-
tional theory.  It is one thing to engage in work with assumptions that 
might be undermined by the work of specialists in another disci-
pline—there is no way that legal scholars can entirely avoid that risk.  
It is quite another thing to proceed on the basis of assumptions that 
you know to be contradictory or incoherent. 
The antimony of realism and formalism cannot be avoided.  It 
must be confronted.  Head on. 
 
B.  Formalism and Neoformalism 
The core of formalism may sound naïve and platitudinous.  For-
malists believe assertions like the following:37 
• Judges should apply the law and not make it.38 
• There are legal rules that constrain what legal actors may lawfully do.39 
• There is a difference between following the law and doing what you 
think is best.40 
• Judges should decide cases in accordance with the text of the applicable 
constitutional or statutory provision or with the holding of controlling 
precedents.41 
I’ve got a million of them, but you get the general idea.  The core 
idea of formalism is that the law (constitutions, statutes, regulations, 
 
 37 See generally Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code, 142 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1033 (1994) (providing an overview of legal formalism); Richard H. Pildes, Forms of For-
malism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (1999) (same). 
 38 This notion is closely related to critiques of “judicial legislation.” See generally Kent 
Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 
COLUM. L. REV. 359 (1975) (discussing critiques of “judicial legislation”). 
 39 The idea that legal rules constrain judges was the subject of the “indeterminacy debate.” 
See generally William A. Edmundson, Transparency and Indeterminacy in the Liberal Critique of Critical 
Legal Studies, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 557 (1993) (detailing ways that formalism constrain ac-
tion). 
 40 This idea is captured by the following passage from an article by Scott Altman: 
She differs from Houdini, however, both because she feels obligated to follow the law 
when she thinks it wrong, and because she feels obligated candidly to offer the reasons 
that convince her. 
An activist judge might believe that the goal of judging is to do what is best for the 
world in every case, and that she must consult her own moral vision in order to do so. 
Like Houdini, she does not have the goal of trying to follow law. 
Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296, 311 (1990). 
 41 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990) (dis-
cussing the revival of plain meaning); Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Stat-
utes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533 (1992) (advocating the use of “practical 
reason” when interpreting a statute and its plain meaning); David A. Strauss, Why Plain Mean-
ing?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1565 (1997) (arguing that the plain meaning of a statute is a 
common ground on which to resolve disputes). 
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and precedent) provides rules and that these rules can, do, and 
should provide a public standard for what is lawful (or not). 
That is, the core of legal formalism entails a commitment to a set 
of ideas that more or less includes the following: 
1. The law consists of rules. 
2. Legal rules can be meaningful. 
3. Legal rules can be applied to particular facts. 
4. Some actions accord with meaningful legal rules; other actions do not. 
5. The standard for what constitutes following a rule vel non can be publicly 
knowable and the focus of intersubjective agreement. 
These core notions of legal formalism are thin (they don’t assume 
much).  So far, I’ve only said that legal rules can be meaningful, ap-
plied to particular facts, and the subject of intersubjective agree-
ment.42  I haven’t yet said that most or all legal rules are, in fact, 
meaningful, applicable, or the focus of intersubjective agreement.  
Those are further claims. 
Let me try to be just a bit more concrete before moving on.  The 
core idea of legal formalism is that constraining law is a real possibil-
ity.  Courts could follow the text of the Constitution, could follow the 
plain meaning of statutes, and could follow precedent.  No contempo-
rary formalist is likely to believe that legal formalism is inevitable.  
Even if it turns out that the formal constraint of law is quite powerful 
and pervasive, no one who is familiar with contemporary American 
legal practice could reasonably believe that every outcome in every 
legal dispute is, in fact, determined by the formal constraints of the 
law.  That claim would be just plain silly.  If it were true, no appellate 
court would ever reverse a trial court and no decision of a multi-
member court would ever be less than unanimous.  Moreover, it 
seems quite clear that some legal officials are overtly or covertly real-
ist in their orientation to the law.  The Supreme Court has an ambiva-
lent attitude towards the constraining force of its own prior decisions 
and towards the text of the United States Constitution.  Some lower 
federal court judges seem to ask, “What can I get away with?,” rather 
than “What does the law require?”  The lawyers and judges of today 
were raised on realism and it would be very surprising if they did not 
practice what their professors preached at least some of the time.  
The core idea of legal formalism is that a formalist legal practice is a 
choice-worthy possibility and not that the United States Supreme 
Court hews the formalist line. 
 
 42 This thin version of legal formalism is similar to what Frank Michelman calls “minimal 
legal formalism” in his contribution to this symposium.  See generally Frank Michelman, Unenu-
merated Rights Under Popular Constitutionalism, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 121 (2006). 
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C.  Misconceptions:  What Formalism Is Not 
Contemporary discourse is full of misconceptions about formal-
ism.  Let’s clear the brush. 
1.  Misconception One:  Formalism Entails Mechanical Jurisprudence 
The first misconception is that formalism entails “mechanical ju-
risprudence.”43  In truth, this is likely a bundle of interrelated but in-
consistent ideas.  One version of the “mechanical jurisprudence” cri-
tique concedes that formalist legal practice can and does translate 
legal texts into more or less determinate outcomes in particular cases, 
but points to the costs of relative rigidity, precluding the intelligent 
consideration of purpose or foreclosing the practice of equity.  If 
these are the real arguments, then the charge of “mechanical juris-
prudence” is really just a pejorative label for other objections, which I 
address separately below.44 
Another variant of the objection goes to the possibility of formal-
ism—arguing that, for formalism to get off the ground, truly me-
chanical jurisprudence would be required.  But, the objection goes, 
the application of legal rules is not truly mechanical—judgment is 
required for rules to be applied to particular facts.  Because me-
chanical jurisprudence is impossible, legal formalism is a myth.  One 
premise of this version of the objection is true:  truly mechanical ju-
risprudence—the kind that could be performed by a machine—is 
impossible (without major breakthroughs in artificial intelligence).  
The error lies in the assumption that legal formalism must be me-
chanical.  That assumption is simply false.  Formalism requires rule-
following—sure enough!  But rule-following need not be mechanical 
in any literal sense of that word.  The application of rules to particu-
lar facts may require sensitivity to context and purpose, but that does 
not mean that there are no rules or that the rules do not have con-
straining force. 
 
 43 See, e.g., Arthur J. Jacobson, The Other Path of the Law, 103 YALE L.J. 2213, 2218 (1994) (as-
serting that mechanical application is a characteristic of formalist law); Mann, supra note 37, at 
1058 (describing formalism as involving “the mechanical application of rules”); William H. 
Simon, Conceptions of Legality, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 669, 669–70 (2000) (describing a formalist con-
ception of law that requires rote compliance with straightforward rules).  The phrase “mechani-
cal jurisprudence” was made famous by Roscoe Pound’s article of that title.  Roscoe Pound, Me-
chanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908). 
 44 See infra Parts III.C.2, III.C.3. 
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2.  Misconception Two:  Formalism Excludes Consideration of Purpose 
The second misconception is closely related to the first.  The 
charge of mechanical jurisprudence sometimes refers to the idea that 
formalists apply rules without attention to their underlying purposes.  
Of course, sometimes rule application can proceed without explicit 
consideration of or deliberation about the purpose of the rule being 
applied.  But this need not be the case.  Formalists can take the pur-
poses of rules into account in a variety of ways, including (but not 
limited to) the following: 
• The purpose of a rule may be relevant to an initial determination of its 
salience.  Rules are sometimes formulated in very general and abstract 
language.  Appreciation of the purpose of the rule may help distinguish 
those contexts where the rule is salient from those outside its domain of 
application. 
• The purpose of a rule may assist in the resolution of ambiguity or vague-
ness.  This point is so familiar that elaboration is hardly necessary.  For-
malism does not deny that rules are sometimes ambiguous or vague, and 
there is simply no reason for formalists to deny reference to purpose 
when interpreting a vague or ambiguous rule. 
• The purpose of a rule may aid in discerning its original public meaning.  
Purpose is relevant evidence of meaning, and hence anyone concerned 
with discovering meaning will have reason to consider purpose. 
Of course, there may be difficulties with ascertaining the purpose of a 
legal rule, but these difficulties must be overcome by instrumentalists 
who wish to employ purposive analysis as a component of rule appli-
cation.  If purposes are indiscernible, instrumentalists are in a real 
sticky wicket. 
3.  Misconception Three:  Formalism Precludes Equity 
The third misconception is a close sibling of the first two.  It might 
be argued that formalists must “follow the rules” no matter where 
they lead, even if the results are absurd or disastrous.  There is some-
thing to this objection because there are different conceptions of le-
gal formalism and different institutional mechanisms by which for-
malism can be implemented.  One might be opposed to the practice 
of equity for formalist reasons—on the ground that a general power 
of equity cannot be constrained and therefore is inconsistent with 
formalism.  Or one might argue for institutional constraints on the 
power of equity—confining the power to a special tribunal or, in 
criminal cases, to the exercise of clemency by the executive. 
But formalism need not eschew equity.  Indeed, the classical (Aris-
totelian) conception of equity is entirely consistent with some ver-
sions of legal formalism.  Here is how Aristotle framed the issue in 
Book V, Chapter 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics: 
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What causes the difficulty is the fact that equity is just, but not what is le-
gally just:  it is a rectification of legal justice.  The explanation of this is 
that all law is universal, and there are some things about which it is not 
possible to pronounce rightly in general terms; therefore in cases where 
it is necessary to make a general pronouncement, but impossible to do so 
rightly, the law takes account of the majority of cases, though not un-
aware that in this way errors are made.  And the law is none the less right; 
because the error lies not in the law nor in the legislator, but in the na-
ture of the case; for the raw material of human behavior is essentially of 
this kind.45 
Aristotle’s notion of epieikeia is usually translated as “equity,” but can 
also be translated as “fair-mindedness.”  As Roger Shiner puts it: 
Equity is the virtue shown by one particular kind of agent—a judge—
when making practical judgments in the face of the limitations of one 
particular kind of practical rule—those hardened customs and written 
laws that constitute for some society that institutionalized system of 
norms that is its legal system.46 
Of course, formalism cannot incorporate the practice of equity if 
that involves a commitment to an unconstrained power to substitute 
private judgments about fairness for the law—that would be the an-
tithesis of formalism.  But there is no reason for formalism to reject a 
practice of equity that refuses to apply a legal rule when it would lead 
to absurd consequences. 
4.  Misconception Four:  Formalism Entails Conceptualism 
Yet another misconception about formalism is that formalism en-
tails conceptualism47—the idea that legal rules can be deduced from 
the “heaven of legal concepts”48 to use von Ihering’s notorious satiri-
cal phrase.  One might use the term “formalism” to describe a con-
ceptualist approach to the common law, but that is not the kind of 
formalism this essay is about.  A formalism that emphasizes fidelity to 
legal texts—constitutions, statutes, and precedents—cannot fairly be 
 
 45 ARISTOTLE, THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE:  THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 199  (J.A.K. Thomson 
trans., Penguin Books 1984) (1953). 
 46 Roger A. Shiner, Aristotle’s Theory of Equity, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1245, 1260–61 (1994) (in-
ternal citations omitted). 
 47 See Paul N. Cox, An Interpretation and (Partial) Defense of Legal Formalism, 36 IND. L. REV. 57, 
61 (2003) (“[Antiformalists can be characterized as arguing that] [l]egal decision should not 
proceed then from fidelity to the heaven of legal concepts, but rather from consideration of the 
consequences of alternative decisions.”). 
 48 MORRIS R. COHEN & FELIX S. COHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 
678–89 (1951) (translating excerpts from RUDOLF VON JHERING, Im Juristischen Bergriffshimmel, in 
SCHERZ UND ERNST IN DER JURISPRUDENZ (1884)). 
4ARTICLES_REVISED.DOC 11/30/2006 12:02:47 PM 
174 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 9:1 
 
characterized as conceptualist, much less as relying on some form of 
Platonism.49 
5.  Misconception Five:  Formalism Entails the Right Answer Thesis 
This one is really important.  Formalism is sometimes thought to 
entail a “right answer” thesis, a view that in each and every case there 
is one and only one “right answer.”50  Of course, formalists can affirm 
the right answer thesis, but the insistence on a single right answer in 
each and every case is not a necessary feature of formalism.  Formal-
ism does require two things that are related to (but distinct from) the 
right answer thesis.  First, formalism requires that there be wrong an-
swers—that is, formalism requires that the legal rules exclude at least 
some possible outcomes as legally incorrect.  Second, formalism re-
quires that the choice among the legally acceptable outcomes pro-
ceed by some method that is legally sanctioned—including discretion 
if the legal rules grant discretionary authority to the relevant legal ac-
tor. 
All that was awfully abstract.  What do I really mean?  Formalism 
can and should accept the proposition that more than one outcome 
in a case can be legally correct.  And formalism can and should ac-
cept the notion that the law sometimes confers discretionary author-
ity on legal actors, including judges.  At a conceptual level, formalism 
need not say more, but a fully developed legal formalism will go be-
yond the conceptual level.  Normative legal formalism will argue that 
legal systems should minimize the role of discretion and provide 
mechanisms of institutional settlement that provide as much certainty 
and predictability as is appropriate and sensible.  In a common law 
system, one prominent mechanism is the system of precedent (or 
 
 49 Cf. Scott Brewer, On the Possibility of Necessity in Legal Argument:  A Dilemma for Holmes and 
Dewey, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 9, 39 (2000) (“Perhaps the most significant feature of legal realist 
legal theory (taking Holmes and Dewey as leading representatives) is its vigorous rejection of 
any ‘tender minded’ metaphysical view (often labeled ‘natural law’) according to which legal 
rules are timeless eternal truths in some kind of Platonic heaven of legal concepts.” (quoting 
William James, The Present Dilemma in Philosophy, in PRAGMATISM AND OTHER ESSAYS (1963) (us-
ing the term “tender minded”))); Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 
74 OR. L. REV. 1131, 1134 (1995) (“By ‘conceptualism,’ I mean a style of legal thought and rea-
soning that emphasizes definitions, categories, and syllogistic logic.  The ‘heaven of legal con-
cepts’ features belief both in the relative coherence and integrity of bright-line legal categories 
and in the relative objectivity of language.  Thus, conceptualist theorists and judges generally 
prefer rules over standards, certainty over flexibility, questions of law over questions of fact, and, 
at a deeper level, individualism over community.”). 
 50 See James W. Bowers, Incomplete Law, 62 LA. L. REV. 1229, 1234 (2002) (“To the classical 
formalists, law . . . meant a scientific system of rules and institutions that were complete; in that 
the system made right answers available in all cases; formal in that right answers could be derived 
from the autonomous, logical working out of the system.” (quoting Pildes, supra note 37, at 
608)). 
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stare decisis) that narrows the range of legally correct outcomes over 
time. 
6.  Misconception Six:  Formalism Excludes the Exercise of Practical Judgment 
The notion that legal formalism somehow excludes the exercise of 
practical judgment51 is closely related to the claim that formalism is 
mechanical and excludes consideration of purposes.  The application 
of rules to particular situations necessarily involves practical judg-
ment, and legal formalism does not seek to deny this.  Legal formal-
ism is inconsistent with the idea that legal actors should simply make 
all-things-considered practical judgments and ignore the law.  But the 
notion that law requires practical judgment does not require that 
rules be ignored or relegated to the status of a “factor” to be balanced 
against other first-order reasons. 
7.  Misconception Seven:  Formalism Requires Perfect Compliance 
Another important point.  Some critics of formalism seem to as-
sume that formalism requires perfect compliance in implementation.  
This point is frequently made in connection with originalism in con-
stitutional interpretation.  If some originalist judges sometimes fail to 
act in conformity with the demands of originalist theory, then 
originalism is bankrupt.  More generally, if formalist judges are some-
times influenced by ideology or their own judgments about what the 
law should be, then—the argument goes—formalism does no better 
than instrumentalism in constraining judicial power.  Stated in this 
bald fashion, this argument is simply awful.  Humans are imperfect; 
judges are no exception to this rule.  Welfarist judges will sometimes 
fail to maximize welfare.  Deontologist judges will sometimes fail to 
respect rights.  Heck, instrumentalist judges may find themselves 
blindly following the rules!  Formalist judges will sometimes fail to 
follow the law.  Of course!  Perfection isn’t the relevant standard.  
That is not to say that there is no standard.  For formalism to get off 
the ground as a live possibility, it must be the case that a viable for-
malist legal practice could come to exist.  If there were no practical 
plan of institutional design and judicial selection that could produce 
outcomes constrained by law, then formalism would be a mere con-
ceptual possibility.  The important point is that the existence of im-
 
 51 Cf. Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 
MICH. L. REV. 676, 678–79 (2005) (characterizing Mark Tushnet as contrasting formalism with 
“all-things-considered . . . practical judgment”); James Steven Rogers, Policy Perspectives on Revised 
U.C.C. Article 8, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1431, 1535 n.155 (1996) (contrasting “formal consistency” 
with “practical judgments attuned to particular circumstances”). 
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perfection does not, by itself, entail that formalist judging is impossi-
ble. 
D.  The Case for Neoformalism 
What is the rationale for formalism in general and rule-of-law neo-
formalism in particular?  My answer to that question will proceed in 
three stages.  In stage one I shall limit myself to shallow arguments—
arguments that do not rely on deep premises about moral or political 
philosophy.  In stage two, I will deepen the argument by discussing 
the distinction between private and public judgment and making the 
case for law’s function in providing public standards for the resolu-
tion of disputes where coordination through agreement in private 
judgments is likely to fail.  In stage three, I will skim the surface of an 
even deeper set of arguments that would make the case for neofor-
malism on the basis of the deep premises of moral and political phi-
losophy. 
1.  Stage One:  The Shallowest Case for Rule-of-Law Neoformalism 
Why would we want legal actors (paradigmatically, judges) to fol-
low preexisting, publicly available rules when they could do what they 
believe is the all-things-considered best action?  Why be lawful when 
you could be just?  We can begin answering these questions by imag-
ining a world in which an extreme form of legal instrumentalism pre-
vailed.  That will set the stage for a consideration of the connection 
between legal formalism and the virtues of the rule of law. 
Imagine a world in which legal practice was thoroughly instru-
mentalist—a world with the absolute minimum constraining force of 
law.52  In this world, judges are realist through and through.  The 
constitutional text is just a starting point for the real work of norma-
tive analysis.  Statutes are applied when their purposes are served—
even if the legislature got the text mucked up.  Courts of last resort 
don’t even pretend that their own prior decisions have binding 
force—stare decisis is reduced to a rule of thumb, with the advan-
tages of stability weighed against the costs of adopting the optimal le-
gal rule.  Lower courts follow the decisions of their superiors, but not 
slavishly, modifying the rules formulated by higher courts when that 
will serve the underlying purposes of the law and ignoring the prece-
dents altogether when some great evil can be avoided. 
 
 52 Extreme legal instrumentalism is legal instrumentalism—not a world without law.  So we 
imagine a world with legal institutions (and hence power-conferring and jurisdictional rules).  
For legal instrumentalists, judges may decide in accord with the rationale of a rule and not its 
letter, but even extreme instrumentalists might require that the text of the rule and facts about 
its history be relevant to determining its purpose. 
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Continue with the thought experiment.  The last vestiges of legal 
formalism have fallen away, but human nature has not changed.  
These realist judges have the same beliefs about politics and morality 
that our judges have.  They are from the left, right, and center.  Some 
of them believe in rights, others in consequences.  Some are liber-
tarians; others are cultural conservatives.  Some believe that women 
have a fundamental human right to choose whether or not to give 
birth; others believe that the unborn have the same moral status as 
other humans with the consequence that abortion is murder.  Some 
believe we are a Christian nation; others believe in strict separation of 
church and state.  Some believe in free markets; others believe that 
justice requires a radical redistribution of income and political 
power.  This instrumentalist world—like ours—is characterized by the 
fact of pluralism.53 
Pluralism and instrumentalism interact.  The fact that judges view 
themselves as policymakers—as legislators with fancy robes—does not 
escape the attention of presidents and senators, governors and legis-
lators, parties and pundits.  Judicial selection is politicized with a 
vengeance.  No one believes that litmus tests are improper:  political 
actors should obviously select judges on the basis of their political 
ideologies (unless there are compelling reasons of political patronage 
to do otherwise).  The members of multimember courts begin to 
read game-theoretic analyses of their tactical options with relish—
seeking to manipulate their agendas.  Logrolling becomes the 
norm—votes are traded across cases and courts.  The line is drawn 
and the proposal to create a market for vote trading is rejected. 
Once instrumentalism is firmly established, it begins to affect the 
way that other institutions and individuals perceive judicial authority.  
Of course, there may be reasons for executives, administrative agen-
cies, and legislators to defer to the general rules articulated by the 
courts but these reasons are merely instrumental.  The advantages of 
complying with the rules must be weighed against the costs.  The 
same goes for ordinary citizens.  It does not escape their notice that 
the rules contained in the supposedly authoritative legal texts are 
only rules of thumb. 
Instrumentalism can be put to good ends, but not all ends of legal 
actors are good.  The instrumentalism of high principle leads to the 
instrumentalism of low politics.  Why should judges be neutral arbi-
ters in election law cases?  The costs of using judicial power to throw a 
presidential election to someone who will appoint like-minded judges 
may be high, but those costs must be weighed against enormous 
benefits.  Even trial judges have the ability to affect political processes 
 
 53 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 144 (1993) (describing “a political conception of 
justice” as accommodating “the fact of reasonable pluralism”). 
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in important ways.  An able judge can influence the outcome of a 
high-stakes class action lawsuit to the benefit of politically-active par-
ties or lawyers, who can return the favor in the form of campaign do-
nations that will advance the cause by assisting the election of legisla-
tors and executives who sympathize with the judge’s policy 
preferences. 
Assuming that the fact of pluralism obtains, the world of extreme 
instrumentalism is a world without the virtues of the rule of law.54  
The outcome of disputes in trial courts and in multimember appel-
late courts that sit in panels would depend on the luck of the draw.  
In courts of last resort that sit en banc, outcomes would be stable so 
long as the membership of the court remained the same, but when 
the median justice—the one whose political ideology was at the mid-
point of the court’s left-to-right alignment—shifted, whole areas of 
doctrine would undergo tectonic shifts, the magnitude of which 
would vary with ideological distance between the old and new mid-
points.  Of course, these shifts might not be quite as destabilizing as 
we imagine since lower court judges view vertical stare decisis as a 
mere factor to be considered in their all-things-considered decision-
making process. 
Some aspects of the world of extreme instrumentalism may sound 
disturbingly familiar.  Others may sound like wild exaggerations.  And 
the advocates of legal instrumentalism will surely cry foul:  “We don’t 
mean that kind of extreme realism.  The rule-of-law values—stability, 
certainty, predictability—are important instrumental values.  There 
are instrumentalism reasons for judges to place a thumb on the scale 
in favor of orderly processes that give substantial weight to formal le-
gal rules.” 
What should the formalist say to the instrumentalist who argues 
for moderation?  At this stage in the argument, the formalist should 
lay claim to the territory that has been conceded.  If moderate in-
strumentalists concede that the great value of the rule of law provides 
good and sufficient reasons for some degree of legal formalism, then 
the question becomes, “How much?”  The contested ground is now 
all occupied by substantial formalist elements—rules of vertical stare 
 
 54 Extreme instrumentalism might be consistent with the rule of law in a world where there 
was a very high degree of consensus about morality and politics.  In such a world, values would 
be highly cohesive, and this cohesiveness might well create the predictability, certainty, and sta-
bility associated with the rule of law.  Ironically, however, given this high degree of cohesion, 
one would expect that the formal legal materials—the constitutions, statutes, and prior deci-
sions—would be in agreement with judicial preferences.  Given this fact, legal practices might, 
in fact, be quite formalist—because the need to depart from the result dictated by the formal 
legal materials would be rare.  Even if judges were willing to be extreme instrumentalists, the 
world of moral and ideological cohesions would give them few reasons to practice what they 
preach. 
4ARTICLES_REVISED.DOC 11/30/2006 12:02:47 PM 
Oct. 2006] CONSTITUTIONAL STARE DECISIS 179 
 
decisis, substantial prudential weight for horizontal state decisis, rules 
of jurisdiction, respect by coordinate branches for the authority of 
courts, and so forth.  We are asking a new set of questions.  How 
much instrumentalism is too much?  Do particular instrumentalist 
practices lead to slippery slopes?  Does the practice of instrumental-
ism by some actors in the system—judges or those who select 
judges—lead others to retaliate with instrumentalist countermoves, 
and if so, are their stable equilibria at points with substantial amounts 
of instrumentalist legal practice?  Once the ground of argument has 
shifted to these questions, we have a debate about which version of 
formalism is best and not whether legal formalism is incoherent or 
utopian. 
2.  Stage Two:  Formalist Legal Practice Provides Public Standards for the 
Resolution of Disputes 
Stage one of the argument is easy.  Although there may be advo-
cates of perfect instrumentalism, they are few and far between.  Stage 
two of the argument is difficult.  In our post-realist age, moderate in-
strumentalists—or as I would put it, moderate formalists—are legion.  
You are probably one of them.  How can moderate formalists be per-
suaded to take several steps in the direction of robust formalism?  Or 
failing that, how can they be persuaded to take formalism seriously—
to view contemporary neoformalism as a live option, a serious intel-
lectual contender?  More directly, how can I persuade you—the 
reader—to reconsider your resistance to formalist legal theory? 
I believe that there is a master argument that serves as the key to a 
radical shift in perspectives in the debate between formalists and real-
ists.  You’ve heard this argument before—in various forms.  If your 
jurisprudential orientation is instrumentalist, it’s quite likely that it 
has nagged at you at some point.  The easiest way to introduce the 
argument is with a question: 
Are you willing to entrust the power to engage in instrumentalist legal 
practice to those with whom you disagree on matters of political ideology 
and morality?  Or would you prefer that your opponents be constrained 
by formalism? 
If you are a libertarian, how do you feel about instrumentalist judges 
who are cultural conservatives?  If you are a liberal Democrat, how 
about instrumentalist judging by conservative Republicans?  If you are 
a deontologist, how about instrumentalist judging by utilitarians? 
It seems to me these questions are likely to elicit one of the follow-
ing answers: 
• Answer 1:  Judges with whom I agree with should be instrumentalists, but 
judges who are my opponents should be formalists.  That’s because I am 
right and they are wrong.  So, when my opponents act in an instrumen-
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talist fashion, I will condemn their departures from the rule of law, but 
when my friends are instrumentalist, I will praise their wisdom. 
• Answer 2:  All judges should be instrumentalists.  That’s why it is impor-
tant to get control of the mechanisms of judicial selection, so that only 
(or mostly) judges who agree with me are on the bench.  I won’t criticize 
my opponents for their instrumentalism, but I will criticize them for 
their ideology and values. 
You might think that no one could possibly give answer number 
one—which is charitably described as stupid and more accurately 
characterized as unprincipled—but, of course, we have all seen an-
swer one in action.  So, we are left with answer two.  What is good for 
the goose is good for the gander. 
Of course, at this stage, some instrumentalists might have reason 
to pause, contemplating the possibility that instrumentalism in the 
hands of ideological opponents who control the mechanisms of judi-
cial selection might do more evil than instrumentalism in the hands 
of ideological allies does good.  At best, the value of instrumentalism 
seems to be contingent on the politics of judicial selection.  The deep 
premises of instrumentalism would seem to support formalism under 
unfavorable political conditions.  But of course, that position col-
lapses into a version of answer one: 
• Answer 1a:  Judges should be instrumentalists when my allies control the 
judicial selection process but, during periods when my opponents domi-
nate judicial selection, judges should be formalists.  I will criticize my 
opponents for the selection of instrumentalist judges when they are in 
power but work for the selection of instrumentalists when my allies hold 
sway. 
Answer 1a is no better than Answer 1.  The hypocrisy of this position 
may be less apparent, because it is diachronic rather than synchronic, 
but hypocrisy it is.  So, we are back to Answer 2, with a twist: 
• Answer 2a:  Judges should be instrumentalists regardless of who controls 
the judicial selection process.  During periods when my ideological allies 
are out of power, I won’t criticize my opponents for their instrumental-
ism, but I will criticize them for their ideology and values. 
Of course, you may be willing to live with the positions outlined in 
Answers 2 and 2a.  But you may not.  If not, then you must either em-
brace Answers 1 and 1a or consider the alternative—a consistent 
formalism. 
There is a larger and more subtle point to this exercise.  The 
question and answers outlined above are designed to elicit an appre-
ciation of the scope-of-decision problem.  What do I mean by “scope 
of decision?”  Sometimes our scope of decision is a single action—the 
decision in a single case or the appointment of a single judge.  But 
not all issues take single actions as their scope of decision.  The 
choice between instrumentalism and formalism has a very large scope 
of decision.  When we are asking whether legal instrumentalism or 
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legal formalism is more attractive, we are not asking whether a par-
ticular judge should be a formalist or whether a single case should be 
decided instrumentally.  The natural domain of decision for the 
choice between instrumentalism and formalism extends across the 
entire practice of law, including judicial selection and adjudication, 
although there may be room for carving out subdomains of legal 
practice that would be governed by special principles. 
Let me try to express that same point in a different way, approach-
ing the problem from a different angle.  The decision between for-
malism and instrumentalism cannot be made on a case-by-case basis.  
Why not?  Suppose you tried to decide in each case whether to em-
ploy formalist or instrumentalist methodology.  How would you make 
that decision?  You might make an ad hoc, all-things-considered 
judgment whether it would be better to be instrumentalist or formal-
ist.  But if you proceeded in that way, then you simply have made an 
instrumentalist decision.  If you choose the formalist outcome on in-
strumental grounds, you are deciding in an instrumentalist fashion.  
It’s the method, not the outcome that counts.  The alternative would 
be to use formalist methodology to make the decision.  But then you 
have made a formalist decision.  Of course, the formal method may 
authorize the judge to employ instrumentalist techniques:  for exam-
ple, Congress may pass a statute that employs the term “reasonable” 
or a rule of procedure may employ a case-by-case multifactor balanc-
ing test.  But even when formal methods use instrumentalist tech-
niques, the outcome is derived from within formalism.  Let me repeat 
the main point:  the decision between formalism and instrumentalism can-
not be made on a case-by-case basis.  The scope of decision is larger:  we 
are choosing a practice to apply to a whole domain. 
The next step in the argument concerns the purpose of law as an 
institution.  The point of law is to provide public standards for the 
resolution of disputes.  We need law because private judgments about 
how disputes ought to be resolved will inevitably be in conflict.  One 
reason for the conflict in private judgment is the problem of partial-
ity.  The parties to a dispute will frequently disagree about who 
should prevail on the basis of an all-things-considered ad hoc judg-
ment about what is best because of self-interest and differences in 
perspective.  But self-interest is not the only source of disagreement 
in private judgments about what resolutions of disputes are best.  In a 
free society, there will be a plurality of views about morality, justice, 
and politics.  These differences are crystallized in the political context 
by competing ideologies.  Even if the problem of partiality could be 
overcome, the fact of pluralism would remain.  So the point of law is 
to provide a public standard for the resolution of disputes. 
How can law serve this function?  What is required for the law to 
provide public standards for the resolution of disputes?  First, legal 
standards for dispute resolution must be made publicly available.  
4ARTICLES_REVISED.DOC 11/30/2006 12:02:47 PM 
182 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 9:1 
 
And how can that be accomplished?  The classic solution is to write 
them down.  One mechanism for writing them down is codification.  
Write a code.  Frame a constitution.  Another mechanism is for 
judges to write opinions when they resolve disputes; this mechanism 
may require that someone else, for example treatise writers, summa-
rize the cases to reduce the costs of access to the law.55 
There is a second requirement that must be satisfied for the law to 
provide public standards for the resolution of disputes.  The meaning 
of the law—the principles that will guide its application to particular 
cases—must be the subject of substantial intersubjective agreement.  
Having a code is not enough.  There must also be a relatively high 
degree of consensus about what the code means and how it applies. 
Given these two desiderata—publicity of the laws and intersubjec-
tive agreement on their meaning—the choice between instrumental-
ism and formalism begins to come into focus.  In a pluralist society 
characterized by problems of partiality, instrumentalist judging is 
likely to fail on both scores.  First, given an instrumentalist practice, 
the real work of deciding disputes will frequently be done by the pri-
vate judgments of adjudicators.  The statute doesn’t decide the case; 
rather, the judge’s opinion about the purpose of the statute and what 
would constitute good policy does the real work.  Second, given the 
fact of pluralism, instrumentalist standards of judging are unlikely to 
serve as the focus of intersubjective agreement.  On the bench, the 
disagreements are characteristically seen as the product of the clash 
of ideologies.  In the academy, similar disagreements may be charac-
terized as theoretical differences—Nozick versus Rawls or Posner ver-
sus Dworkin. 
By way of contrast, formalism seems to do a comparatively better 
job of satisfying the two desiderata.  Indeed, the satisfaction of these 
desiderata explains much of the shape of contemporary formalism.  
Formalists emphasize the need for publicly available standards for the 
resolution of disputes.  They are keen on the plain meaning of legal 
texts precisely because this methodology provides the best mecha-
nism for making the law accessible.  Likewise, the need for intersub-
jective agreement explains why formalists prefer plain meaning to 
meanings that are dependent on contestable judgments about pur-
poses or intentions. 
The argument of stage two is now complete.  When we decide be-
tween formalism and instrumentalism, we are making a decision 
about which practice shall be applied to a domain—not how a par-
ticular case shall be decided or whether a particular judge shall be 
 
 55 In societies in which there is a high degree of social cohesion, much of the law may be 
embodied in unwritten or customary law that is transmitted through the informal sanctions that 
enforce social norms. 
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appointed.  The practice is a legal method and the domain is a legal 
system.  When we make that decision, we need to consider the func-
tion of law, which is to provide publicly available standards for the 
resolution of disputes.  Formalism aims at publicity and intersubjec-
tive agreement on the standards of legal judgment.  Instrumentalism 
is the legal theory that subordinates those aims to another goal—
producing the best outcome as determined by the private judgment 
of the legal actor, in other words, by the judge.  Law must be substan-
tially formalist to do its work. 
Of course, this does not mean that the law will come tumbling 
down if a single judge decides a single case in an instrumental fash-
ion.  So long as the system is sufficiently formalist, the rule-of-law val-
ues of predictability, stability, and certainty can be achieved.  The dif-
ficulty is not with one judge in one case.  The difficulty is with the 
systematic adoption of a case-by-case approach that authorizes indi-
vidual judges to decide instrumentally when their private judgment 
suggests that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages.  This kind 
of case-by-case approach leads to the tyranny of small decisions.  The 
rule of law is undermined, not by a single judge in a single case, but 
by the accumulation of many decisions in many cases.  This is a real 
slippery slope—once we start to slide, it really is hard to stop.56  If 
right-wing judges see left-wing instrumentalism, they will be tempted 
to respond in kind—and vice versa, of course.  If one great social is-
sue is resolved by judicial fiat in favor of one side of the ideological 
divide, it seems quite rationale to retaliate in kind when the balance 
of power shifts.  If the balance of power shifts back and forth with 
some frequency, political and judicial actors may see the system as a 
prisoners’ dilemma, with ideological judging and judicial selection as 
the dominant move.  In other words, even a little instrumentalism 
may be a dangerous thing. 
3.  Stage Three:  Deep Justifications for Formalism 
So far, the case for formalism has been relatively shallow.  I have 
avoided the deep waters of moral and political philosophy.  This 
strategy of avoidance serves an important purpose.  The question of 
whether the unenumerated rights cases should be considered au-
thoritative for neoformalist reasons can easily lead us to the more 
general question of whether legal formalism is consistent with more 
general views about political morality and ethics.  And from there it is 
just a hop, skip, and a jump to debates in political and moral phi-
losophy about which theories of political morality and ethics are best 
 
 56 See generally Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026 
(2003) (writing in detail about the concept of a “slippery slope” argument). 
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or correct.  Obviously, we’ll never get anywhere if we try to tackle 
those big questions on their merits.  Nonetheless, the question of ul-
timate justification is a fair one.  After all, if legal formalism is incon-
sistent with the best or correct views about political morality and eth-
ics, then it should be rejected. 
In this essay, all I can really do is offer promissory notes.  I’ve al-
ready gone some distance towards the articulation of a consequential-
ist case for legal formalism.  The argument in stage one provides con-
sequentialist reasons for rejecting legal instrumentalism.  The 
argument in stage two gives reasons why the scope of decision should 
be whole practices rather than individual cases.  These two arguments 
can be combined in predictable ways with consequentialist premises 
about moral philosophy.  The deontological case for legal formalism 
is likely to begin from a different starting point.  Deontological for-
malists are likely to emphasize the idea that individuals have a right to 
have their dispute decided in accordance with the existing law; con-
sequentialist judging, with an emphasis on the ex ante, inevitably in-
volves the violation of these rights when it requires a change in the 
rules, in other words, when it makes a difference.  And the aretaic 
case for legal formalism would begin in an entirely different place—
with the virtue of justice.  In the language of virtue jurisprudence, the 
case for legal formalism begins with the notion that a virtuous judge 
must be nominos—respectful of the laws and the widely-shared and 
deeply-embedded social norms of her community. 
E.  A Neoformalist Theory of Constitutional Law 
For the sake of argument, let’s assume that the case for neofor-
malism is sufficiently strong to be taken seriously.  What are the im-
plications for constitutional law?  What would a neoformalist theory 
of constitutional law look like?  These are not easy questions:  Ameri-
can constitutional law is a tough nut for formalists to crack.  Why?  
First, the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence has always in-
cluded prominent realist elements.  Second, the United States Con-
stitution contains a variety of abstract and general provisions—
“executive Power,”57 “freedom of speech,”58 etc.—which seem to invite 
the judges to invest their own ideology or values into the process of 
constitutional interpretation.  In other words, we are familiar with a 
realist practice of constitutional interpretation and have a difficult 
time imagining a formalist practice.  But constitutional realism is not 
inevitable.  We can imagine a much more formalist style of constitu-
tional interpretation—one that takes the constitutional text and stare 
 
 57 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 58 Id. amend. I. 
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decisis seriously.  Consider the following six principles as one version 
of constitutional formalism: 
Constitutional Formalism, Principle One, Precedent:  Judges in constitutional 
cases should follow an adequate and articulated doctrine of stare decisis. 
Among the features of such a doctrine is that even courts of last resort 
(i.e., the United States Supreme Court) should regard their own consti-
tutional decisions as binding, overruling prior cases (or limiting them to 
their facts) only when the precedents themselves require this result. 
Constitutional Formalism, Principle Two, Plain Meaning:  When the prece-
dents run out, judges should look to the plain meaning of the salient 
provisions of the constitutional text. 
Constitutional Formalism, Principle Three, Intratextualism and Structure:  When 
the text of a particular provision is ambiguous, judges should construe 
that provision so as to be consistent with other related provisions and 
with the structure of the Constitution as a whole. 
Constitutional Formalism, Principle Four, Original Meaning:  If ambiguity still 
persists, judges should make a good faith effort to determine the original 
meaning, where original meaning is understood to be the meaning that 
(i) the framers would have reasonably expected (ii) the audience to 
whom the Constitution is addressed (ratifiers, contemporary interpret-
ers) (iii) to attribute to the framers, (iv) based on the evidence (public 
record) that was publicly available.59 
Constitutional Formalism, Principle Five, Default Rules:  And when ambiguity 
persists after all of that, then judges should resort to general default rules 
that minimize their own discretion and maximize the predictability and 
certainty of the law. 
Constitutional Formalism, Principle Six, Lexicality and Holism:  The first five 
principles are to be understood as lexically ordered in the following 
sense:  Judges should order their deliberations by the first five principles, 
attempting to structure their conscious deliberations by attending to the 
features highlighted by each principle in order before proceeding to the 
next principle.  But this requirement does not entail that judges either 
will not or should not recognize that the considerations thematized by 
 
 59 This formulation is an adaptation of Grice’s famous distinction between speaker’s mean-
ing and sentence meaning. See Paul Grice, Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions, in STUDIES IN THE 
WAY OF WORDS 86 (1989) (detailing the distinction between what the speaker says and what the 
written language of the speaker’s message conveys); Paul Grice, Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence Mean-
ing, and Word Meaning, in STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS, supra at 117, 118 (“I wish to make 
within the total signification of a remark:  a distinction between what the speaker has 
said . . . and what he has implicated . . . .”); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Texting 5 
(May 16, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (“We have to live with their text 
message.  Can’t we choose what meaning to assign it?  Or get involved in high politics and 
choose the judges who choose the meaning?  Or choose the judges who choose the unmean-
ing—after all, it’s just a text message.”); Richard E. Grandy & Richard Warner, Paul Grice, in 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2005), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/grice 
(“Grice contends sentence and word meaning can be analyzed in terms of what speak-
ers . . . mean.  Utterers’ meaning . . . can be analyzed without semantic remainder in terms of 
utterers having certain intentions.”). 
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one principle may be relevant to deliberations explicitly organized by an-
other principle.  Thus, the interpretation of a precedent will sometimes 
(perhaps always) require consideration of the text, structure, original 
meaning, and so forth.60  These are principles, not rules, and lexical or-
dering operates as a methodological heuristic and not as a rigid rule. 
These six principles are appropriate to the commitments of rule-of-
law neoformalism, but they do not represent the only form that con-
stitutional formalism could take.61  In particular, the first principle af-
firms the role of stare decisis but does not specify that role in detail.  
We now have the theoretical resources in place to tackle that task. 
IV.  A NEOFORMALIST CONCEPTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL STARE 
DECISIS 
The Supreme Court should consider itself bound by its own prior 
decisions—that’s my claim.  I don’t think anyone else is making this 
claim, and that doesn’t surprise me.  The mainstream of constitu-
tional theory is antiformalist—opposed to hard constitutional law 
whether it is derived from the text, history, or precedents.  Original-
ists may be formalists, but they too are usually opposed to really 
strong stare decisis; if Supreme Court decisions were considered 
binding, it would be very difficult to “restore the lost constitution.”62 
Nonetheless, it is surely worth investigating how neoformalism 
might articulate a conception of constitutional stare decisis.  That’s 
the enterprise of this part of the article. 
A.  Distinguishing Realist and Formalist Approaches to Stare Decisis 
The best place to start is with the contrasts between realist and 
formalist approaches to precedent.  Two distinctions are important:  
first, the difference between instrumentalist consideration and bind-
ing legal force, and second the opposition between the legislative 
conception of holdings and the idea of holding as ratio decidendi. 
 
 60 Lexical ordering is a guideline for structuring deliberation and is not inconsistent with 
the observation that interpretation involves what Gadamer called the hermeneutic circle. See 
HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 235–36, 257–58 (1986) (describing the concept of 
the “hermeneutic circle”). 
 61 An actual practice of constitutional neoformalist judging would need to take into account 
the differences among the various versions of rule-of-law formalism.  Some differences may be 
conventional; with respect to conventional differences, one might reasonably expect that judi-
cial practice will converge over time.  Other differences may be more substantive, reflecting dif-
ferent judgments about how best to achieve the rule of law or about the appropriate balance 
between the rule of law and other values.  With respect to these differences, it seems utopian to 
hope for perfect agreement.  Rather, one would expect that different neoformalist judges and 
courts would have distinct styles, reflecting their differing conceptions of the best version of 
neoformalism. 
 62 The allusion is to the title of Randy Barnett’s book.  BARNETT, supra note 22. 
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1.  Instrumentalist Consideration versus Binding Force 
What role should precedent play in the constitutional decisions of 
the Supreme Court?  The conventional view is that the Supreme 
Court should afford its own prior decisions a presumption of validity.  
What does that mean?  One possibility would be that this “presumption” 
is a mere “bursting bubble.”63  Precedents will be followed until and 
unless there are good reasons to depart from them.  If this were the 
only role for precedent, then it would be virtually no role at all—it 
takes only a slender needle of flimsy argument to burst a bubble.  
Likewise, the presumption view is virtually meaningless if it only de-
cides cases in which the arguments for and against sticking with the 
precedent are in equipoise.  Of course, there will be some cases in 
which the arguments for and against a change in the law are perfectly 
balanced, but such cases are likely to be rare. 
The presumption view of the force of precedent is implausible.  A 
more reasonable view is that precedents are entitled to weight be-
cause of the costs of legal change.  One such cost is associated with 
reliance and expectations.  Individuals and institutions may fail to re-
ceive expected benefits or incur avoidable costs.  Another set of costs 
may be related to the implementation of new legal rules; at a mini-
mum, the treatises will need to be rewritten.  The instrumentalist view 
of precedent conceives of the decision whether to overrule existing 
precedent as simply adding another factor to the balance of factors 
that are relevant to the selection of an optimal rule.  From the realist 
perspective, precedents should be overruled when the benefits of 
overruling exceed the costs and precedents should be followed when 
they already provide the optimal rule or when the costs of changing 
the law are greater than the marginal benefits the better rule would 
provide. 
The instrumentalist view of precedent is peculiar, because it de-
nies that Supreme Court precedents should be treated as legally au-
thoritative by the Supreme Court itself.  One way of drawing out this 
 
 63 For discussion of the “bursting bubble” theory of presumptions, see D. Craig Lewis, Should 
the Bubble Always Burst?  The Need for a Different Treatment of Presumptions under FRE 301, 32 IDAHO 
L. REV. 5, 6 (1995) (“Under the ‘bursting bubble’ approach a presumption does not affect the 
burden of persuasion on an issue.  Instead, it serves only to shift to the party opposing the pre-
sumption the burden of coming forward with some substantial evidence contradicting the pre-
sumed fact.  When that burden is met, the ‘bubble bursts’—the presumption disappears, and 
the factual issue addressed by the presumption is decided based solely on the evidence pre-
sented concerning the issue.”).  See also JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 
AT THE COMMON LAW 336 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1898) (“[T]he presumption . . . goes no 
further than to call for proof of that which it negatives . . . .”); 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2491, at 304–07 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1981) (ex-
plaining that the effect of a presumption is to compel the jury to reach a certain decision “in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary from the opponent.”). 
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peculiarity is by comparing the situation in which there is a prior Su-
preme Court precedent on a particular point of law to the situation 
in which there is no prior decision and a new case presents a novel 
issue of law.  Of course, it is possible that the former case involves 
greater reliance interests than the latter case, but this is not necessar-
ily so.  It might well be that the relevant individuals and institutions 
have made plans based on guesses about the Supreme Court’s likely 
decision or that they have made plans for no good reason at all.  
From the instrumentalist perspective, reliance interests are valued in 
terms of consequences of disappointed expectations.  Stare decisis is 
simply one mechanism by which reliance interests could be gener-
ated.  The point is that the instrumentalist conception reduces the 
force of precedent to a contingent policy concern—one that may 
drop out entirely in some cases. 
What is the alternative?  The formalist conception of stare decisis is 
based on the idea that precedents are legally-binding or authoritative.  
That is, a formalist believes that precedents provide what are some-
times called “content independent” or “peremptory” reasons for ac-
tion.  Of course, the formalist conception of precedents as legally 
binding is quite familiar, even in our realist legal culture.  When it 
comes to vertical stare decisis, the conventional notion is that the de-
cisions of higher courts are binding on lower courts.  A court of ap-
peals may not decide to overrule a Supreme Court decision because 
the advantages of the better rule outweigh the costs of changing legal 
rules.  The idea of binding precedent also operates at the level of in-
termediate appellate courts.  Three judge panels of the United States 
Courts of Appeal are bound by the prior decisions of the court; they 
are not free to decide that the benefits of a better rule outweigh the 
benefits of adhering to the law of the circuit. 
The neoformalist conception of stare decisis is based on the idea 
that precedents are more than mere presumptions and that they have 
binding legal force that cannot be reduced to the instrumental rea-
sons for adhering to them. 
2.  Legislative Holdings versus Ratio Decidendi 
There is a second contrast between realist and formalist concep-
tions of precedent.  Realist courts are inclined to view their power as 
legislative in nature.  This is clearest in the case of courts of last re-
sort, as is the Supreme Court of the United States in constitutional 
cases.  This leads to the emergence of what might be called the legisla-
tive holding, in which the opinion of the Court includes a phrase that 
may begin, “We hold that . . .” and then states a broad rule that de-
cides the case at hand but may go far beyond its facts.  Lower courts 
may be inclined to treat legislative holdings as authoritative.  For one 
thing, courts of last resort have a power that real legislatures lack:  
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they can actually intervene in particular cases and address direct or-
ders to the lower courts.  Legislative holdings blur the familiar dis-
tinction between dictum and holding.  From a realist perspective, a 
firm statement of the rule joined by a clear majority may constitute 
good evidence of the court’s future actions—even if the statement is 
unnecessary to the resolution of the dispute at hand. 
Even formalists may be tempted by the practice of legislative hold-
ings;64 after all, they do facilitate predictability and certainty about the 
content of the law.  There are, however, formalist reasons for adher-
ing to the traditional view of stare decisis—that opinions are binding 
only insofar as they decide the case before the court.  This is the tra-
ditional theory of the ratio decidendi, “the reason for the decision,” 
which is limited by the legally salient facts of the case that is decided.  
Given this traditional view, case law is slow moving.  It takes many de-
cisions to create a general rule, and many more to change one.  
Given the realist practice of “legislative holdings,” a single case could 
create a right to abortion with an elaborate three trimester scheme.  
And a single case could abolish that right.  Given the formalist alter-
native, a right to abortion could only have been created through 
many decisions; once established, it would take many more to modify 
or extinguish that right. 
3.  Binding Force and Ratio Decidendi in Tandem 
Before proceeding any further, it is worth noting that the two dis-
tinguishing features of the realist idea of precedent work in tandem.  
When legal rules are emerging, they are built slowly, piece by piece.  
Once established by a body of precedent, a legal rule can only change 
slowly.  Each alteration must be consistent with the binding force of 
prior decisions.  New cases can only move the law by small steps, 
whose limits are demarcated by the facts which define ratio decidendi 
of the new case.  Working in tandem, these two features of the neo-
formalist doctrine of precedent operate to create predictability, cer-
tainty, and stability in the law—not by declaring broad rules in single 
cases but through the accumulated decisions of many cases over time. 
B.  Constitutional Stare Decisis as Institutional Self-Binding 
At this point, there is likely to be some theoretical resistance to 
the neoformalist conception of constitutional stare decisis.  Is it even 
 
 64 The phrase “legislative holding” is familiar, but little used in academic legal writing.  See, 
e.g., Note, Implementing Brand X:  What Counts as a Step One Holding?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 
1552 (2006) (using the term to describe the nature of Supreme Court holdings as a result of a 
limited docket). 
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possible for the Supreme Court to bind itself?  This question is illu-
minated by contrasting the situation of the Supreme Court from that 
of the lower federal courts with respect to vertical stare decisis and 
three-judge panels of the court of appeals with respect to horizontal 
stare decisis with respect to the law of circuit.  The obvious contrast 
concerns institutional mechanisms for the enforcement of the bind-
ing effect of precedent.  If a lower court disregards a Supreme Court 
precedent, the Supreme Court can reverse, summarily if necessary.  If 
a three-judge panel ignores the law of the circuit, the whole circuit 
can reverse en banc, acting as a sort of internal appellate court for 
this purpose.  But if the United States Supreme Court fails to follow 
its own prior decisions, no higher court will reverse them.  Without 
an institutional enforcement mechanism, does it even make sense to 
say that the Supreme Court could treat its own prior decisions as 
“binding?” 
This is a familiar problem in general jurisprudence.  The conven-
tional solution to this problem is what H.L.A. Hart called “the inter-
nal point of view.”65  The notion that a norm can be law only if it is 
enforced by someone other than the addressee of the norm has an 
obvious regress problem.  If the Supreme Court cannot bind itself to 
precedent, how can it bind itself to the Constitution or federal stat-
utes?  Of course, some extreme realists might deny that the Constitu-
tion is law, but this is an extreme and unusual position, even in this 
realist age. 
C.  Qualification One:  Formalist Reasons for Overruling Precedent 
I am arguing for the idea that the Supreme Court should regard 
its own prior decisions as binding.  A simple version of this idea might 
regard binding constitutional precedents as permanent fixed points, 
subject only to the modifying force of constitutional amendment.  
That is not my view.  I shall argue that the idea of a permanent fixed 
point is not the best expression of a neoformalist conception of con-
stitutional stare decisis.  Instead, precedents can be overruled (or 
confined to their facts) for formalist reasons, including because a 
precedent is no longer consistent with precedent. 
“Overruling precedent for formalist reasons”—how would that 
work?  Some will detect a faint odor of paradox in the claim that 
 
 65 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 54, 198 (1961) (articulating the dependency of a 
legal system upon voluntary allegiance); see also NEIL MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART 45 (1981) 
(noting the value Hart places in “[t]he observance of shared or common rules”); Brian Bix, 
H.L.A. Hart and the Hermeneutic Turn in Legal Theory, 52 SMU L. REV. 167, 173 (1999) (differen-
tiating Hart’s internally binding “rules” from less consequential “habits”); Dennis Patterson, 
Explicating the Internal Point of View, 52 SMU L. REV. 67, 74 (1999) (“Hart was right to look for 
the uniqueness of law . . . in the intersubjective relations of legal actors.”). 
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precedents can be overruled on the basis of precedents.  Wouldn’t 
really strong stare decisis mean that precedents are “fixed points” 
which can never be overruled?  And how could precedents be over-
ruled on the basis of precedents? 
The idea that precedents have binding force does not entail that 
precedents must be understood as permanent fixed points.  The core 
idea of a neoformalist conception of constitutional stare decisis is that 
precedents are legally-binding.  But a legal norm can be both binding 
and subject to change.  And one way that a binding precedent can be 
changed is through the force of other precedents.  The argument to 
establish this conclusion can be made in three steps. 
Step One:  Binding Precedents Can be Overruled and Still be Binding.  
This claim is actually quite simple and uncontroversial.  Take the case 
of a Supreme Court decision that is binding on the lower federal 
courts because of the doctrine of vertical stare decisis.  The idea that 
such decisions have binding force is uncontroversial, but so is the 
idea that a Supreme Court decision can be overruled or modified by 
other legal norms.  The clearest case would be a constitutional 
amendment.  Chisholm v. Georgia was binding on the lower federal 
courts, but it was overruled by the Eleventh Amendment.66  Similarly, 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a statute can be overridden by 
another statute.  We have no trouble conceptualizing the notion that 
binding precedent can be modified or nullified by other authoritative 
legal materials. 
Step Two:  The Legal Norms Generated by Stare Decisis Can Change Over 
Time.  This claim is just a teensy weensy bit controversial.  Sometimes 
we think of holdings as “judicial legislation”—that is, we view the 
statement that follows “We hold that X” establishes a legal norm with 
content X.  But this is not the neoformalist conception of the way in 
which precedents generate legal norms.  Individual cases have hold-
ings that are limited to their legally salient facts.  Only a line of cases 
can develop a rule that approximates legislation.  That means that 
the doctrine of precedent allows for the evolution of the law—a point 
that is basic to almost every theory of common law.  As precedents are 
added to a line of authority, the legal norms created by the line can 
change, becoming broader, wider, deeper, and more articulated.  Iso-
lated holdings become general rules which acquire exceptions.  One 
way of establishing this point is via the familiar maxim:  “The law 
works itself pure.”67 
Step Three:  The Accumulation of Precedent Can Create a Legal Rule that 
Invalidates a Prior Holding.  Once again, this is basic stuff.  I’m not do-
 
 66 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 67 Omychund v. Barker, 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 23 (Ch. 1744) (argument of solicitor-general, the 
future Lord Mansfield). 
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ing anything fancy here.  A case is decided, subsequent cases distin-
guish the prior cases.  Early in the development of the line of author-
ity, the original case is taken as representing a rule and the later cases 
represent exceptions.  As the exceptions grow, the field is reversed 
and the original case is now seen as an exception.  But as time goes 
on, the exception is confined to a narrower and narrower zone of cir-
cumstances.  Eventually, it becomes clear that the zone has narrowed 
to the vanishing point and the original case is now seen as a “mis-
take”—which once could but no longer can be reconciled with the 
whole line of cases.  Finally, a court will acknowledge that the original 
case is “overruled” or “confined to its facts.” 
Does it make a difference whether we say that a precedent is over-
ruled or confined to its facts?  Legal realists are inclined to view these 
two descriptions as functionally equivalent, and there is a sense in 
which this realist insight is correct:  in either case the decision loses 
all generative force.  But within neoformalism, there is a point to us-
ing the old-fashioned “confined to its facts” locution.  What point is 
that?  When we say that a precedent is “confined to its facts,” we em-
phasize the idea that holdings are not legislation.  The holding of a 
case is always the product of the nexus of fact and law in a particular 
dispute.  When we say “confined to its facts,” we are making the 
boundedness of precedent explicit.  When we start talking about 
holdings being overruled, we may be tempted to analogize to the re-
peal of a statute—exactly the wrong idea.  I don’t think it matters 
much whether we use the language of overruling or the language of 
confining, as long as we are clear what we do mean and what we don’t! 
D.  Qualification Two:  Unlawful Decisions, Antiformalist Precedents, and 
the One-Way Ratchet 
There is another qualification to the idea that precedents are 
binding.  This qualification is complex.  It begins with the idea of 
“unlawful decision” and then proceeds to consider a very thorny 
question:  whether antiformalist precedents should be considered as 
lawful and binding, and if so, in what circumstances. 
1.  Unlawful Decisions and the Limits of Binding Force 
Let’s begin with a fairly obvious point.  The idea that precedent 
should be binding can be qualified by distinguishing between “law-
ful” and “unlawful” decisions.  Not just anything that the Supreme 
Court could issue would constitute a lawful decision.  Let’s illustrate 
this point with an example.  Sometimes absurd examples are the best 
ones.  Here’s a doozy.  Suppose that in Bush v. Gore the Supreme 
Court had issued a decision that declared that neither Bush nor Gore 
had been elected and that for reasons of policy and national security, 
4ARTICLES_REVISED.DOC 11/30/2006 12:02:47 PM 
Oct. 2006] CONSTITUTIONAL STARE DECISIS 193 
 
the Court had decided to make Chief Justice Rehnquist the President 
of the United States.  It is hard to imagine how this decision could be 
justified as lawful—as within the legal authority of the Supreme 
Court.  Similarly, the Supreme Court would lack legal authority to 
decide a case in which no appeal or writ of certiorari was ever filed. 
If the Supreme Court were to render an unlawful decision, para-
digmatically, a decision beyond the outer boundaries of its authority, 
then the unlawfulness of the decision would be a good reason, a for-
mal legal reason, to deny the decision binding precedential force.  
There is no reason why neoformalism should be committed to giving 
unlawful decisions the same binding force as lawful decisions. 
2.  The One-Way Ratchet and Self-Defeating Formalism 
At this point, I’m going to back up and start from a new angle by 
exploring a formalist argument against precedent—which is some-
times called “the ratchet” or “the one-way ratchet.”  The argument 
called “the ratchet” is actually a cluster of related arguments.  All of 
the arguments share a common structure.  Let me begin with a fairly 
standard statement of the argument: 
Suppose that the conservative critiques of the Warren Court are cor-
rect—that the decisions of the Warren Court (or at least many of them) 
cannot be defended on formalist grounds.  What then would be the ef-
fect of a return to formalism?  Why, it would lock in the realist decisions 
of the Warren Court era.  But it would do more than that.  Even if for-
malist judging were to prevail for years or decades, the pendulum might 
swing back to realism at some point in the future.  But the realists of the 
future will not be constrained by the formalist decisions of their prede-
cessors.  And hence during future periods of realism, the law would be 
distorted by yet another increment. 
You can see where the argument goes.  If formalists respect prece-
dent and there are alternating periods of realism and formalism, 
then we have a ratchet.  For emphasis, we might use the redundant 
phrase, one-way ratchet.  If this argument were correct, then it might 
be argued that formalist theory should not incorporate a strong doc-
trine of precedent, because a strong doctrine would make formalism 
self-defeating.  Formalism would actually operate to entrench realist 
decision making—if we assume that judicial selection will result in 
periods during which realist judges dominate the courts. 
How can formalists avoid the ratchet?  Consider the following two 
options:  (1) rejection of the doctrine of stare decisis, and (2) reser-
vation of full stare decisis effect for formalist precedent. 
The first possibility is to eschew precedent.  That is, formalists 
could accept a sort of realist attitude about precedent in order to 
achieve formalist goals.  For example, originalists might reject the 
doctrine of stare decisis in order to accelerate the pace at which the 
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Constitution in the courts approaches the original meaning.  There 
are, however, difficulties with this approach.  Originalists are unlikely 
to embrace the idea of an originalist “big bang,” in which the original 
meaning was restored at once.  Such a big bang might impose intol-
erable costs—requiring, for example, a substantial realignment of 
state and federal authority and a restructuring of the separation of 
powers.  As an alternative, originalists might adopt an instrumentalist 
attitude about precedent—changing doctrine in the direction of the 
original meaning at a gradual pace by balancing the value of restora-
tion with costs of constitutional change.  This avoids the disruption 
that would accompany a “big bang,” but also puts every case in an in-
strumentalist frame.  If the goal is formalist judging, then instrumen-
talism about precedent is a poor means. 
Wholesale rejection of precedent would create another problem, 
which we might call doctrinal instability.  Sensible formalists need not 
deny that some constitutional questions are close, even if one is 
committed to textualism and originalism.  Without constitutional 
stare decisis, there would be no guarantee of stability and predictabil-
ity of constitutional law.  Each time a constitutional issue reached the 
Supreme Court, the Justices would be obligated to consider the ques-
tion afresh and shifting opinions or changes in the Court’s composi-
tion could result in the law shifting back and forth.  For all of these 
reasons, the complete rejection of constitutional stare decisis seems 
undesirable. 
The second alternative is for formalists to distinguish between 
what we might call “formalist precedents” and “realist precedents.”  
Prior decisions which rest on formalist grounds could be given full 
binding force, whereas precedents that rest on instrumentalist 
grounds could be treated as entitled only to presumptive validity.  
This option avoids the one-way ratchet:  instrumentalist precedents 
are not locked in.  Giving stare decisis effect to formalist precedents 
would create stability and predictability as the body of binding for-
malist precedent grows. 
 
3.  Precedent About Precedent:  Formalism in a Realist Era 
I am going to back up yet a third time and tackle this problem 
from yet another angle.  It might be argued that a formalist approach 
to precedent is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s own realist 
practice.  In other words, it might be argued that the Supreme 
Court’s modern cases are precedents establishing a rule that prece-
dents are not binding.  Of course, the instrumentalist cannot endorse 
this argument, because the argument relies on a formalist premise.  
And the formalist need not accept the proposition that instrumental-
ism can entrench itself by formalist methods; after all, that claim 
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would be internally inconsistent.  Once these points are in place, we 
are in a position to appreciate yet another reason for formalists to be 
skeptical about treating instrumentalist precedents as formally bind-
ing.  Instrumentalist decisions just aren’t constructed in a way that 
they can be considered binding; because of the instrumentalism built 
into the decision, the case simply cannot bear the burden of being 
treated as binding law. 
But the fact that instrumentalist precedents are poor candidates 
for treatment as binding law does not mean that they are irrelevant.  
Given the realist nature of contemporary legal practice, any move-
ment towards a neoformalist conception of constitutional stare de-
cisis will inevitably encounter transition problems.  In the actual 
world, the transition to formalism could only happen gradually.  Most 
judges have strong instrumentalist habits, and old habits die hard.  
Even if judicial selection processes overwhelmingly favored formalist 
judges, it would still take a generation for the bench to turn over.  
And even if the bench were occupied entirely by formalist judges, the 
work of reshaping all of American law would surely take another gen-
eration. 
Given the practical realities that put breaks on any movement to-
wards constitutional formalism, it is inevitable that instrumentalist 
precedents will persist for quite some time.  The law may work itself 
pure, but the work is done one case at a time. 
E.  Three Objections and Answers 
Before we wrap up the elaboration of a neoformalist conception 
of constitutional stare decisis, let’s briefly examine three objections:  
(1) the objection that precedent is inconsistent with the authority of 
the Constitution; (2) the objection that neoformalism is unfeasible or 
utopian; and (3) the objection that stare decisis would lock in evil 
precedents. 
1.  The Objection that Precedent is Inconsistent with the Authority of the 
Constitution 
Some originalists may object to constitutional stare decisis on the 
basis of the notion that only the Constitution itself should be consid-
ered to be legally authoritative.  If the precedents are consistent with 
the meaning of the Constitution, then the doctrine of stare decisis 
doesn’t make a difference.  If the precedents are inconsistent with 
the Constitution, then judges are obligated to follow the Constitution 
itself, not the precedents—so the argument would go. 
There is something to this argument.  Affording strong stare de-
cisis effect to precedents that disregarded the Constitution would, in 
fact, be to elevate the status of judicial decisions above the Constitu-
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tion itself.  And such elevation would be inconsistent with the formal 
rule that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land.  In addi-
tion, giving precedents the power to overrule the Constitution would 
create questions of legitimacy.  It is unclear whether there is any the-
ory that would legitimate the assignment of a power to overrule the 
Constitution to the Supreme Court. 
But these same problems do not exist if we are dealing with 
precedents that are based on formalist legal reasoning that aims at 
the interpretation and application of the original meaning of the 
Constitution.  Such decisions do not involve an implicit claim that the 
Supreme Court may overrule or modify the Constitution; quite the 
contrary, they assume the opposite. 
Of course, it is possible to disagree about the meaning of the Con-
stitution.  We may come to believe that a prior decision—although 
formalist in method—involved a mistake.  The question then be-
comes, can we legitimately give stare decisis effect to a formalist deci-
sion if we believe the decision is mistaken?  The answer to this ques-
tion is “yes, we can.”  Once we are operating within the realm of 
formalist precedents, the question is not “Are we respecting the au-
thority of the Constitution?” but is instead, “What is the institutional 
mechanism by which disputes about the meaning of the Constitution 
are to be settled?”  At one extreme, we can imagine that we would en-
title each and every government official the authority to decide for 
herself what the Constitution means.  The problems with that system 
are obvious:  it would create uncertainty, unpredictability, and insta-
bility that would undermine the rule of law.  Various other possibili-
ties exist.  We could give every judge the power to interpret the Con-
stitution de novo, with no horizontal or vertical stare decisis.  That 
system would not be as chaotic as one which gave the authority to 
every official—high and low—but it would, nonetheless, be a real 
mess.  We could imagine a system in which every Supreme Court Jus-
tice has interpretive authority, but a doctrine of vertical stare decisis 
binds the lower courts.  That system would be more stable, but would 
still involve shifts in constitutional meaning as the composition of the 
Court changes and as individual Justices change their minds.  And at 
the other extreme from total hermeneutic polycentricism would be a 
system in which the decisions of the Supreme Court which respect 
that text and original meaning are given binding effect, granting ear-
lier Supreme Courts the power to constrain the interpretations made 
by later Supreme Courts.  This final option maximizes the rule-of-law 
values of stability, predictability, and certainty. 
2.  The Objection that Neoformalism is Unfeasible or Utopian 
The final objection expresses what for many readers will be a nag-
ging doubt.  Is there any point in discussing a neoformalist concep-
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tion of stare decisis given political reality?  Isn’t neoformalism “pie in 
the sky?”  Even if neoformalism is a “theoretical possibility,” is it a 
“practical impossibility?” 
I take the feasibility question to be an important one, but before I 
answer this objection I should note that feasibility is not a conversa-
tion stopper—at least not so far as legal theory is concerned.  Why 
not?  One way of answering this question draws upon the familiar dis-
tinction between “ideal” and “no ideal” theory.68  Even if we were con-
vinced that current political realities make neoformalism impractica-
ble, we still would have good reason to think about an ideal 
constitutional system. 
Another way of answering the feasibility question would be to ar-
gue that neoformalism is not utopian but represents a live option for 
constitutional practice in the actual world.  This is not the occasion to 
develop that argument in full, but we can preview the way the argu-
ment might go.  Let’s begin with the intuitive reasons for suspecting 
that formalism is pie in the sky.  One such reason might proceed 
from a theory of human nature.  It might be thought that actual 
world judges are simply incapable of following precedent when it 
conflicts with their own policy preferences.  No doubt, there are some 
judges who are incapable of restraining themselves.  Neoformalist 
judging will be feasible, in this sense, so long as there are judges who 
are capable of self restraint.  It’s possible that someone can produce 
evidence that humans simply are incapable of following the law and 
suppressing their own preferences, but absent such evidence, the case 
for the infeasibility of neoformalist judicial practice has not yet been 
made. 
But even if judges are capable of fidelity to law, this merely moves 
us over to the domain of judicial selection.  It might be argued that 
the judicial selection process is tilted towards the selection of ideo-
logical judges, and hence that it is unrealistic to believe that formalist 
judges could be selected by our actual politicians.  Given current po-
litical circumstances, this might be right.  It’s true that many politi-
cians profess allegiance to legal formalism.  What could be more 
platitudinous than a politician saying that judges shouldn’t make the 
law?  But this may be “cheap talk.”  Underneath the formalist plati-
tudes, it may be that cynical politicians not only know that almost all 
 
 68 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 2, at 7–8 (1971) (defending the value of princi-
ples of justice that may not work for all situations); Legal Theory Lexicon 011:  Second Best, 
Legal Theory Lexicon, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/11/legal_ 
theory_le_1.html (Nov. 23, 2003, 10:26 EST) (describing the theory as follows: “[W]hen the 
first-best policy option is unavailable, then normative legal theorists should consider second-
best solutions.”). 
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judges are realists but covertly want to select realist judges who match 
their own policy preferences. 
Is it feasible for the judicial selection process to produce a formal-
ist judiciary?  Consider two scenarios, each of which expresses a dif-
ferent route by which political actors might come to select formalist 
judges.  The first scenario begins with the assumption that the politi-
cians who select judges today pay lip service to the value of formalism 
but actually want realist judges who share their political preferences.  
In this case of the federal system, this assumption means that liberal 
Democrats want liberal judges, conservative Republicans want conser-
vative judges, and so forth.  And let’s further assume that they want 
judges who will vote their politics, for example, that all politicians ac-
tually want realist judges.  But these preferences are not set in stone.  
One can imagine that the political actors might come to believe that 
it was actually in their interest to select formalist judges.  How might 
such a belief form?  The answer to this question can begin with the idea 
that even the most cynical of politicians are likely to believe that what 
we might call “ultrarealist judging” could have disastrous conse-
quences.  Imagine a world where judges openly decided each and 
every case based on the political impact.  Elections were always re-
versed when a majority of the court of last resort wanted the other 
candidate to win.  The political affiliations of the lawyers determine 
the outcome when the case itself has no big political consequences.  
Presumably, even thoroughgoing realists see the value of the rule of 
law and formalist constraint in this sort of extreme case.  If this is cor-
rect, then political actors already have a preference for at least a 
modicum of formalism.  And if this is so, then we can also imagine 
that politicians could prefer even more formalism if the case were 
made that more formalism produces more net political benefits than 
costs.  Of course, this case may be difficult in the current political 
context:  for example, the politics of Roe v. Wade make it difficult for 
Democrats to nominate or confirm judges who will overrule Roe and 
difficult for Republicans to nominate or confirm judges who will con-
sider themselves bound by Roe.  So the case for the political value of 
formalism would have to rest on the idea that politicization of the ju-
dicial selection process and of the judiciary leads to very bad conse-
quences—that politicizing Roe v. Wade makes it difficult to avoid the 
politicization of Bush v. Gore and a continuation of this trend heads us 
in the direct of ultrarealism and the degeneration of the rule of law.  
If this case were convincing, then political actors might come to pre-
fer the selection of formalist judges. 
The second scenario is based on a different premise.  Let’s assume 
that politicians care only (or mostly) about short run political conse-
quences.  But now, let’s make the further assumption that judicial se-
lection requires the cooperation from a wide range of political opin-
ion that includes the political center.  In the case of the federal 
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system, this assumption seems fairly realistic, since confirmation re-
quires the cooperation of at least 51 members of the Senate.  Even if 
the presidency is held by someone at the political extremes, the fifty-
first vote required for confirmation must come from the so-called 
“median Senator,” who by definition is at the center of the Senate’s 
ideological spectrum.  If selection requires the cooperation of actors 
with a wide range of political beliefs, then it follows that the judges 
who are selected cannot match the political ideology of all the selec-
tors.  Of course, when political actors decide whether to nominate or 
confirm, their decision always takes place against the backdrop of the 
status quo.  In this case, the status quo is the judiciary as it exists when 
the vacancy arises and the legal outputs that the status quo judiciary 
would create.  A rational political actor will only cooperate in the se-
lection of judges who either leave the status quo intact or who move 
the status quo towards the actor’s own political preferences.  Formal-
ist judges who respect stare decisis are judges who are unlikely to 
change the status quo.  So, formalist judges are almost always within 
the feasible choice set for the judicial selection process—even if we 
assume that political actors are motivated entirely by the desire to in-
fluence the decisions that judges will make.  In a wide variety of pos-
sible political configurations, maintaining the status quo will be the 
only possible outcome, because there will be no change from the 
status quo upon which the President and 51 members of the Senate 
can agree. 
I have presented the two scenarios as alternatives, but they could 
be combined.  That is, political actors might come to see that formal-
ist judges both preserve the political status quo and that they create 
rule-of-law benefits.  Both perceptions could work together to create 
a preference for the selection of formalist judges. 
At this point, I need to make the nature of my claim explicit.  I am 
not trying to argue that the selection of formalist judges is inevitable 
or even likely.  Rather, my aim is to fend off the claim that formalism 
is “pie in the sky” or impossibly utopian.  In order to meet this objec-
tion, I need to show that some potential judges are capable of being 
formalists and that judicial selection systems are capable of choosing 
formalist judges.  That is, I need to make a prima facie showing that 
formalism is possible.  If I have made such a showing, then the bur-
den shifts to those who make the opposite claim.  They need to pro-
vide arguments that establish the impossibility of formalism. 
3.  The Objection from the Existence of Evil Precedents 
Let’s assume that the rule of law provides very great benefits.  We 
can nonetheless imagine that the benefits of the rule of law can be 
outweighed if the substance of the legal status quo is sufficiently bad.  
In particular, we can imagine circumstances in which a strong doc-
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trine of constitutional stare decisis would lock in an evil precedent—
Plessy v. Ferguson,69 for example.  Formalism is faced with similar prob-
lems with other sources of legal evil, e.g., evil statutes or evil constitu-
tional provisions.  What can formalists do about the problem of evil? 
Let’s begin by noting that the problem of evil can be posed for 
any legal theory.  Formalists must face the problem of evil when the 
sources—the authoritative legal texts—require evil results, and a de-
parture from formalism is a feasible option for avoiding evil.  But re-
alists must face the possibility of evil instrumentalist judges under 
conditions where a move to legal formalism is the only feasible tech-
nique for constraint. 
Let’s also note that there is no guarantee that realism about 
precedent will avoid the problem of evil.  It will depend on the cir-
cumstances.  For example, the harms done by an evil precedent 
could be made worse, rather than better, by a move from formalism 
to instrumentalism.  After all, unbound evil instrumentalist judges 
may do even more evil if they were released from the constraints of 
the rule of law. 
Given these considerations, it is clear that from the possibility of 
evil precedents, it does not follow that we must prefer realism to for-
malism as our approach to constitutional stare decisis.  It is a complex 
empirical question whether realism or formalism as a general method 
for constitutional adjudication will produce more evil. 
Nonetheless, it seems fair to assume that formalist judges commit-
ted to a strong doctrine of constitutional stare decisis may someday 
face the problem of an evil precedent.  Of course, the problem of evil 
precedents will be different in different circumstances.  In the case of 
an evil precedent that is embedded in a wicked legal system, the best 
course of action will depend entirely on how one can do the most 
good.  One might join the resistance or attempt to undermine the 
system from inside.  A neoformalist theory of constitutional adjudica-
tion simply need not address this case.  Thoroughly wicked societies 
are special cases. 
But what about the case of a wicked precedent embedded in a le-
gal system that is reasonably just as a whole.  This is a difficult prob-
lem, and the remarks that I offer here are tentative rather than final.  
I am inclined to think that in this case, as in the case of a wicked legal 
system, the case of evil precedents is different from the case of prece-
dents that are merely wrong or unjust.  The value of the rule of law, 
although great, can be trumped by true evil, with the consequence 
that judges are morally released from the legal obligation to regard 
binding precedents as peremptory reasons for actions.  The question 
 
 69 See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding “separate but equal” ac-
commodations for African-Americans). 
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then becomes what action will best avoid the evil while doing the least 
damage to the rule of law.  Several options might be considered.  
One is frank acknowledgement of the problem, a decision that ad-
mits that the law is being avoided for moral reasons.  Another option 
is obfuscation, a decision that pretends the avoidance of evil is legally 
sanctioned.  Yet another option might be a decision that complies 
with the evil precedent, but limits the damage done as much as the 
law allows.  One can imagine several other possible courses of action.  
The point is that if one is released from the obligation to follow 
precedent, one then must make a nonlegal decision about the best 
available course of action under the circumstances.  Notice, however, 
that this does not entail that a neoformalist conception of constitu-
tional stare decisis is incorrect and that legal realism is a superior 
theory.  The implication is simply that a neoformalist theory of con-
stitutional adjudication has a bounded domain. 
Having said all this, I should address the applicability of this analy-
sis to the Court’s unenumerated rights cases.  I begin with the prem-
ise that most of these cases do not involve problems of grave evil.  
One might think that Griswold or Lawrence is morally wrong, but few 
will think that a society governed by these cases suffers from grave evil 
that would warrant judicial lawlessness.  But there may be some critics 
of Roe v. Wade who believe Roe does pose such a problem.  Those who 
hold such a belief can still affirm a neoformalist conception of consti-
tutional stare decisis as a general matter, so long as they view such 
cases as outside the scope of the theory. 
F.  A Restatement of the Neoformalist Conception 
In sum, the neoformalist conception of constitutional stare decisis 
views the force of precedent as binding rather than as instrumental 
and rejects the idea of legislative holdings.  In particular, the neo-
formalist conception rejects the power of the Supreme Court to over-
rule its own prior decisions for instrumentalist reasons, while affirm-
ing the Court’s authority to overrule (or limit) precedents for 
formalist reasons, including the special reason that a prior decision is 
inconsistent with the whole body of precedent.  In addition, the neo-
formalist conception does not require that unlawful decisions be re-
garded as binding; one reason a decision may be regarded as unlaw-
ful for this purpose is that the decision rests on instrumentalist rather 
than formalist grounds. 
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V.  DOES THE NEOFORMALIST CONCEPTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL STARE 
DECISIS SUPPORT CONTEMPORARY UNENUMERATED RIGHTS 
JURISPRUDENCE? 
Given the neoformalist conception, what can we say about the Su-
preme Court’s unenumerated rights jurisprudence?  My answer to 
this question will take three steps.  Step one is the recognition that 
there is a prima facie case for affording these decisions stare decisis 
effect.  Step two poses two questions:  (1) Do the unenumerated 
rights cases qualify for treatment as binding precedent? and (2) Are 
unenumerated rights in harmony or tension with the original mean-
ing of the constitutional text?  Step three uses the answer to these two 
questions to generate four possibilities and analyzes each of the four 
cases.  Finally, I will consider an alternative possibility, unqualified 
binding stare decisis effect for the unenumerated rights cases. 
A.  Step One:  The Prima Facie Case for Stare Decisis 
The Supreme Court has recognized a variety of “unenumerated 
rights,” most contentiously the right to choose whether to have an 
abortion,70 but also rights to the use of contraceptives in the marital 
relationship,71 of parents to send their children to religious schools,72 
the right to engage in gay sex in private,73 and so on.  Let’s take three 
of these cases, Roe v. Wade, Griswold v. Connecticut, and Lawrence v. 
Texas, as exemplars of the Supreme Court’s unenumerated rights ju-
risprudence. 
There is a prima facie case for affording Roe, Griswold, and Law-
rence stare decisis effect.  The reason for this is obvious:  these are 
cases decided by the Supreme Court.  They have been extended, 
qualified, and limited in various ways, but they have not been over-
ruled.  They have been cited and relied upon, both by the Supreme 
Court74 and by numerous lower courts.75  Although Roe, Griswold, and 
 
 70 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“This right of privacy . . . is broad enough to 
encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”). 
 71 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (“The very idea [of not allowing 
the use of contraception] is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage rela-
tionship.”). 
 72 See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (stating that it is “entirely plain 
that the [Oregon law] unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to di-
rect the upbringing and education of children under their control”). 
 73 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“Their right to liberty under the Due 
Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the 
government.”). 
 74 See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 126 S. Ct. 961, 967 (2006) 
(looking to Roe in evaluation of a parental notification law); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 
920–22 (2000) (applying principles of Roe in striking down a partial-birth abortion ban); 
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Lawrence are controversial—Roe and Lawrence more than Griswold—no 
one argues that the Supreme Court’s decisions in these cases were 
the products of fraud by the Court or a manifest abuse by the Court 
of its legal authority.  Even the harshest critics of the Court’s unenu-
merated rights jurisprudence do not argue that the cases were so 
plainly unlawful that they are null and void.76  Crucially, legal practice 
recognizes Roe, Griswold, and Lawrence as legitimate and lawful deci-
sions by the Supreme Court. 
What does it mean to say that there is a “prima facie case” for af-
fording Roe and Griswold stare decisis effect?  Nothing fancy or subtle.  
That the Supreme Court decided these cases without some grave 
procedural defect is sufficient to create a rebuttable presumption in 
favor of their legal validity.  If Roe and Griswold are to be deprived of 
their precedential effect, then some argument must be offered for 
their invalidity or unlawfulness. 
One more point about the prima facie authority of Roe and Gris-
wold:  If this subsection of the article were read out of context, it 
might be argued that it is question begging, i.e. that I have assumed 
but not argued for the proposition that precedent should play a role 
in constitutional adjudication.  The argument for that proposition 
was presented in Part III.  The prima facie case for affording stare de-
cisis effect to the Supreme Court’s unenumerated-rights cases as-
sumes the general case for constitutional stare decisis. 
B.  Step Two:  Two Questions 
The prima facie case for giving the unenumerated rights cases 
stare decisis effect is rebuttable, depending on whether the decisions 
are regarding as binding and whether they are in harmony with the 
original meaning of the constitutional text.  Each of these two ques-
tions deserves a comment or two. 
1.  Question One:  Do the Unenumerated Rights Cases Qualify for Treatment 
as Binding Precedent? 
The first question about the unenumerated rights cases concerns 
the nature of the grounds upon which they rest.  If a decision rests on 
instrumentalist grounds, then the prima facie case for regarding the 
 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (“[T]he essential holding of 
Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed.”). 
 75 The search string “Roe v. Wade” in the allstates and allfeds databases on Westlaw yielded 
3458 hits on September 2, 2006. 
 76 This assertion may not be strictly true.  For all I know, there may be some critics who have 
argued that the decisions in Roe or Griswold were the result of fraud or a usurpation of authority.  
But these are not the arguments offered by well-informed and reasonable critics. 
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decision as binding is rebutted.  Not so, if the grounds for the deci-
sion were formalist in nature. 
On this occasion, I shall not engage in the exegetical work re-
quired to determine whether Griswold, Roe, or Lawrence are correctly 
characterized as instrumentalist, formalist, or mixed.  The inquiry 
depends on the nature of the grounds offered by the Court.  If the 
Court relies on the constitutional text or precedent as the basis for its 
decision, then it is formalist.  If the Court relies directly on the moral 
goodness or consequences, then it is instrumentalist.  If the Court re-
lies on both, then the decision is mixed. 
2.  Question Two:  Are Unenumerated Rights in Harmony or Tension with 
Original Meaning? 
The second question is not about the reasoning of the cases, but 
rather is about their real relationship to the original meaning of the 
constitutional text.  One possibility is that the decision is supported 
by the text.  Three subcases need to be distinguished here.  One sub-
case is that in which the decision is compelled by the text—no other 
decision is possible.  A second subcase is one in which more than one 
interpretation of the text is reasonable—the original meaning of the 
text is ambiguous, with reasonable arguments supporting more than 
one interpretation.  A third subcase is one in which the constitutional 
text is vague—for example, it is highly abstract—and what is called a 
“constitutional construction” is required to apply the vague text to 
particular cases.  All three subcases should be distinguished from 
cases in which the interpretation or construction of the Constitution 
is unreasonable. 
The answers to the two questions are independent of one another, 
generating four possible circumstances.  Exploring these four possi-
bilities is our next task. 
C.  Step Three, Four Possibilities 
The four possibilities are defined by a two by two matrix as illus-
trated in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1:  FOUR POSSIBILITIES 
 Relationship with Original Meaning? 
Binding Effect? Harmony Tension 
Yes Possibility One Possibility Two 
No Possibility Three Possibility Four 
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1.  Possibility One:  Binding Precedents in Harmony with the Original 
Meaning 
The first possibility is a binding precedent that is in harmony with 
the original meaning.  This is the simplest case.  The neoformalist 
conception of precedent would “lock in” these precedents.  They are 
binding and would be reinforced by subsequent decisions.  As time 
goes by and the surrounding body of neoformalist decision making 
grows, these decisions become more deeply embedded in the web of 
precedent. 
2.  Possibility Two:  Binding Precedents in Tension with the Original 
Meaning 
The second possibility is that there is a binding precedent in ten-
sion with the original meaning.  This possibility obtains when the de-
cision was based on formalist grounds, but would have been decided 
differently if the original meaning of the Constitution had been prop-
erly applied.  This could happen for any number of reasons:  a mis-
understanding of original meaning, an attempt to follow text without 
attention to history, or following precedent that itself was erroneous. 
Suppose that one or more of the unenumerated rights cases fall 
into this category.  Given the neoformalist conception of constitu-
tional stare decisis, such cases should be regarded as binding.  The 
courts will be obligated to consider these decisions as binding.  But 
given the neoformalist conception of holdings as ratio decidendi, the 
reach of a single, isolated erroneous precedent will be quite limited—
extending only to the principles required to resolve the facts before 
the courts.  This means that isolated precedents contrary to original 
meaning will have a limited effect on constitutional adjudication.  
When there is a coherent line of formalist but erroneous precedents, 
the effect will be much more substantial.  Over time, the law would 
tend to work itself pure, as opportunities arise to distinguish the prior 
cases and decide in accord with the original meaning of the Constitu-
tion.  But as a practical matter, this process could take many decisions 
over a period of decades. 
3.  Possibility Three:  Nonbinding Precedents in Harmony with the Original 
Meaning 
The third possibility consists of instrumentalist decisions that 
nonetheless are in harmony with the original meaning.  When these 
decisions are discussed by subsequent decisions in a neoformalist 
mode, their reasoning, but not their results, will be adjusted.  Once 
the correct legal rules have emerged from the ratio decidendi of the 
subsequent line of formalist authority, decisions in the fourth cate-
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gory will acquire a new status.  Touched by the healing power of for-
malist reasoning, such decisions will be transubstantiated from mere 
presumptive validity to binding force. 
4.  Possibility Four:  Nonbinding Precedents in Tension with the Original 
Meaning 
The fourth possibility is a nonbinding precedent that is in tension 
with the original meaning.  In this case, the precedent remains “on 
the books” and is entitled to a presumption of validity.  However, 
once the arguments against the precedent are presented, the case 
loses its binding force.  Such a precedent is subject to overruling—it 
has no binding force.  However, the neoformalist conception of con-
stitutional stare decisis does permit subsequent courts to follow such 
decisions on the basis of rule-of-law considerations, the stability, con-
tinuity, and predictability of the law.  Decisions that fall into this 
fourth category will be subject to the most rapid processes of change 
and correction.  They will be narrowed and then overruled at the 
most rapid pace that is consistent with due consideration for the costs 
of legal change. 
At this point, you will have noticed a pattern.  If the neoformalist 
conception of constitutional stare decisis is consistently applied, 
precedents from categories two, three, and four will gradually be-
come more limited in scope and finally be overruled.  A mere theory 
cannot guarantee that no errors will occur.  Presumably mistakes will 
be made from time to time.  But as the law works itself pure, we 
would expect that the decisions in category one will become more 
numerous and eventually will constitute the overwhelming share of 
constitutional precedents.  At this stage, the majority of constitutional 
doctrine will be in line with the original meaning of the Constitution. 
D.  An Alternative Analysis:  Unqualified Stare Decisis 
There is an alternative conception of constitutional stare decisis 
that deserves comment.  One might view precedents as eternal fixed 
points—not subject to overruling even when they are contrary to le-
gal rules that are clearly defined by surrounding precedents.  If this 
conception were adopted, then the Supreme Court’s existing funda-
mental rights jurisprudence would remain in force, even though it 
might be frozen, without additional generative force. 
E.  The Bottom Line 
All of this has been fairly abstract and hypothetical.  Some readers 
will undoubtedly be asking, “So what is the bottom line?”  Would 
Griswold, Roe, Lawrence, and the rest be slowly eroded and eventually 
4ARTICLES_REVISED.DOC 11/30/2006 12:02:47 PM 
Oct. 2006] CONSTITUTIONAL STARE DECISIS 207 
 
overturned or would they be entrenched by the neoformalist concep-
tion of constitutional stare decisis?  Of course, that’s an interesting 
question.  But it isn’t one that can be answered in this paper.  That’s 
because the answer to that question requires a detailed exegesis of 
the reasoning of each of the unenumerated rights cases and an analy-
sis of the original meaning of all of the relevant provisions of the 
Constitution.  Those tasks are enormous, and I am disinclined to en-
gage in armchair speculation about the results.  My goal here has 
simply been to articulate a formalist framework within which the 
questions could be addressed. 
VI.  CONCLUSION:  UNENUMERATED RIGHTS AND THE FUTURE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 
Justices of the Supreme Court should regard themselves as bound 
by legally valid precedents—by the decisions that are reasoned on 
formalist grounds.  But this does not entail the conclusion that there 
are constitutional fixed points—precedents that never can be recon-
sidered.  Quite the contrary, the best understanding of legal formal-
ism is consistent with the idea that the law works itself pure.  This 
means that our constitutional beliefs are inherently corrigible—
subject to revision in light of new arguments and evidence about the 
meaning of the Constitution.  Even Marbury v. Madison77 or Brown v. 
Board of Education78 could go—although we may not be able to imag-
ine the circumstances in which that would happen—here and now.  
Or to put it another way, if there are constitutional fixed points, their 
fixity consists only in the fact that we cannot yet imagine how they 
would be dislodged.  Marbury or Brown may be “set in stone,” but even 
stone can crumble, topple, or simply be worn away by wind and sand. 
Don’t get me wrong.  I am not asserting that these cases were in-
correctly decided.  Nor am I denying the “priority of the particular” 
in the context of constitutional jurisprudence.  Quite the contrary, it 
is the priority of the particular that undergirds the inherent corrigi-
bility of constitutional jurisprudence.  Because we have confident 
judgments about particular cases, abstract constitutional theories are 
always potentially in jeopardy:  confident assertions about general ju-
risprudence are called into question when they run into recalcitrant 
beliefs about particular cases.  Lines of precedent can run into each 
other—transforming our understanding of the meaning and force of 
what was once considered “settled law.” 
And don’t get me wrong.  On the surface, there is something 
paradoxical about endorsing a formalist conception of stare decisis 
 
 77 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 78 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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while simultaneously denying the existence of constitutional fixed 
points.  After all, aren’t precedents supposed to be the points that are 
fixed by the doctrine of stare decisis?  And of course, they are.  But 
they are only as fixed as it is possible for constitutional judgments to 
be—no less, but no more than that.  That is to say that precedents 
should be binding precedents, but it is just plain silly to think that 
precedents can be “superbinding,” somehow placed beyond the 
power of reason and law.  Belief in superprecedent rests on the same 
mistake as does the reduction of formalism to “mechanical jurispru-
dence.”  The mistake is to miss the ineliminable role of judgment in 
practical reasoning, of which legal reasoning and constitutional rea-
soning are subsets. 
And don’t get me wrong.  When I dismiss “mechanical juris-
prdence” and reject the notion of “superprecedent,” I am not taking 
anything back.  Quite the contrary.  These moves are essential in or-
der to see that formalism (or “neoformalism”) is a live possibility for 
constitutional jurisprudence.  A neoformalist conception of constitu-
tional stare decisis means treating lawful precedents as authoritative—
as providing preemptory reasons for actions.  But it does not mean 
treating all (or even all lawful) precedents as if they possessed some 
magical power to guide action without the intermediation of reason 
and judgment.  That kind of formalism—the realist caricature of 
formalism—is simply incoherent.  Neoformalism gives precedents the 
kind of authority that can figure as a peremptory reason in delibera-
tion, no more but also no less. 
And don’t get me wrong, when I conceive of the Supreme Court 
in bondage, I am not thinking of a submissive Supreme Court, domi-
nated by whips and chains wielded with intent to humiliate by cruel 
legislative and executive masters.  Quite the contrary.  What I am 
thinking about is a Supreme Court that submits in another sense:  a 
Court that binds itself to the rule of law and is entangled by chains of 
text and ropes of precedent.  What I am thinking about is a Supreme 
Court that does not chafe or struggle against the binding force of its 
own prior decisions:  a judiciary empowered by self-imposed restraint. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
